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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Ronald 
No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson 
CA9 has before it a case arising out of this same acci-
dent. When I was there, the panel to whom the case had been as-
signed called for en bane on the basis of the ~.--conflict between 
this case and Uptegrove (the earlier CA9 precedent). That call 
I 
was ~ejected, on the theory that the panel could not call for en 
bane review at that time. It is not clear whether the panel will 
issue an opinion following Johnson or not. If CA9 does follow 
Johnson, the confl~ will disappear. In any event, I think it 
would be better to let this case go by and wait for at least one 
post-Shearer case in the area. Although I do not immediately 
impressed by the argument that Shearer requires the result 
reached in Johnson, CAll thinks it does and a panel in the CA9 
may think it does. In these circumstances, more lower court con-
sideration may obviate the need of this Court's review. 
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JOHNSO cutrix and 
Fed. Tort Claim Act plaint.) 
1. SUMMARY: 







that the executrix (resp) of a deceased member of the Coast Guard 
v 
was not precluded, under the doctrine of Peres v. United States, 
from pursuing her claim under the Federal Torts Claim Act. The 
/ 
alleged negligence involves the conduct of an FAA flight control-
ler resulting in the crash of a helicopter piloted by resp's hus-
band. 
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resp's husband, Lt. Corn-
rnande r Johnson, was a helicopter pi lot stationed in Hawaii for 
the United States Coast Guard. His Coast Guard Station received 
a call to rescue a civilian vessel lost in a serious Pacific 
storm. During the rescue operation, Lt. Corn. Johnson lost the 
ability to pilot his helicopter visually, and he requested the 
assistance of an FAA flight controller. Shortly afterwards, the 
helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of 
Molokai, killing everyone on board. 
Resp sought and received VA benefits for her husband's 
death.l In addition, she brought suit under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA) for damages against the U.s. for the alleged 
negligence of the flight controller assisting her husband at the 
time of the crash. 
The v DC dismissed the action, relying solely on the 
/ 
doctrine announced in Feres v. United States. 2 CAll reversed. 
In a lengthy opinion, CAll held that the lirni tati ton on FTCA 
actions required by Feres v. United States should apply only in 
situations which implicate "the delicate relationships which must 
v 
exist for the military system to properly function." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. A-28. In its opinion, CAll announced a new 
1 Resp asserts whether she did or did not receive VA benefits 
~s not part of the record. 
340 u.s. 135 (1950). The Court in Feres expanded upon the 
exception created in the FTCA for claims "arising out of the 
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the 
Coast Guard, during time of war." 28 u.s.c. ) 2680(j). Under 
the Feres doctrine, military personnel cannot recover under the 
FTCA for injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service." 
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tortfeasor-focused test for determining whether an FTCA claim is 
barred by the Feres doctrine: if the FTCA suit involves alleged 
negligence by a serviceman or an employee of the armed forces, 
then the case fits within "the Feres factual paradigm" and the 
action is automatically barred under Feres. Id., at A-25. If, 
however, the tortfeasor is non-military, then an inquiry must be 
made to determine whether, in light of the three rationales un-
derlying the decision in Feres, allowance of the claim would cir-
cumvent the purposes of the FTCA. Id.3 Although CAll does not 
expressly say so, it appears from the opinion that the only ra-
t ion ale articulated in Fe res that justifies barring a Fe res-
implicated FTCA claim is the military discipline one.4 The pa~el 
acknowledged that its decision was squarely at odds with the con-
elusion reached by another circuit, CA9, dealing with very simi-
lar facts. Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 
19 7 9 ) , c e r t • den i e d , 4 4 4 U • S • 1 0 4 4 ( 19 8 0 ) • But CA 11 f e 1 t that 
Uptegrove was "wrongly decided." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-30. 
3 As noted in Stencel Aero Eng., there are three rationales 
underlying the Feres doctrine: (1) The relationship between 
members of the military and the government is "distinctively 
federal in character." The government's liability to injured 
servicemen should not depend upon in which state a serviceman is 
injured. (2) VA, in effect, has a no-fault compensation scheme 
that provides benefits irrespective of the government's fault. 
This scheme is, therefore, the exclusive remedy for injured 
sevicemen. (3) "The peculiar and special relationship of the 
soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such 
suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if 
suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders 
given or negligent acts committed in the course of military 
duty •••• " 431 u.s., at 671-72. 
4 See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27-29. See especially id., at 
A-29 n. 11. 
7 
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CAll, on ~hg en bane, affirmed its decision after 
this Court decided United States v. Shearer, 105 S.Ct. 3039 
(1985). According to CAll, Shearer "reinforces the analysis set 
forth in the panel opinion." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-4. Four 
judges, however, dissented. Judge Johnson, writing for the dis-
senters, stated that "no court until now has allowed recovery 
against the government in this sort of suit." Id., at A-7. He 
listed a number of circuit cases, all relying upon Feres, which 
deny military plaintiffs recovery. Quoting this Court's opinion 
in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 u.s. 666, 
669 (1977), Judge Johnson made the point that Feres stands for 
the proposition that a military plaintiff cannot recover from the 
government if he or she is injured by a "government official," 
and such official does not necessarily have to be a member of the 
military: "' (i)n Feres .•• the Court held that an on-duty service-
man who is injured due to the negligence of Government officials 
may not recover against the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act."' Pet. for Cert. A-10 (quoting Stencel Aero 
Eng.) (emphasis in original). 
3. CONTENTIONS: SG contends that CAll has created a 
clear split among the circuits. Its opinion in this case direct-
ly contradicts CA9 's decision in Uptegrove. Moreover, CAll's 
decision is inconsistent with Feres and all Supreme Court cases 
construing it. CAll's decision particularly runs afoul of two of 
Fe res' rationales: concerning the mi 1 i tary discipline argument, 
SG notes that the FAA works closely with the military. To allow 
suit against the FAA by members of the military would disrupt the 
-5-
important and sensitive working relationship between the FAA and 
the military. Also, "[i] t would be impossible for a trier of 
fact to evaluate the conduct of the FAA air traffic controllers 
in this case without considering the military nature of the mis-
sion." Pet. for Cert. 12. SG states that the defense of con-
tributory negligence will certainly arise in this litigation if 
CAll's decision stands, and this will in turn necessitate an in-
quiry into the wisdom and reasonableness of the military decision 
to send Lt. Johnson out to rescue the distressed boat. As for 
the "workers-compensation" rationale, SG notes that resp received 
VA benefits for her husband's death. 
Resp acknowledges the split created by CAll's deci-
sion, but believes the split is now "stale" in light of Shearer. 
Resp takes issue with SG's characterization of the facts in this 
case, particularly in how the SG tries to stress the military 
nature of Lt. Johnson's mission. According to resp, Shearer ade-
quately addressed the question presented here: "there is simply 
no need for this Court to grant cert ior ar i in this case to 
reannounce what it just announced in Shearer." Resp.s Brief in 
Opp. 7. Resp also challenges SG's discussion on resp's receipt 
of VA benefits, claiming that this is not part of the record. 
4. DISCUSSION: CAll's decision squarely contradicts 
-==="-
CA9's ·decision in Uptegrove, and cert should be granted to elimi-
nate this conflict. Furthermore, if resp's reading of Shearer 
is correct, then there appears to be a conflict between Shearer 
and this Court's earlier opinion in Stencel Aero Eng. Particu-
-6-
larly focusing on n. 4 in Shearer, resp correctly notes that the 
Court suggested in Shearer that the rationales announced in Peres 
other than military discipline (i.e., the "worker's-compensation" 
and "federal-nature-of-the-military" theories) are "no longer 
controlling." Shearer, however, cites approvingly Stencel Aero 
Eng. which specifically relied upon the two "now-non-controlling" 
factors. 431 u.s., at 672-73. In other words, if this Court in 
Shearer really wished to limit application of Peres to only those 
situations in which mi 1 i tary discipline wi 11 be jeopardized by 
allowing a PTCA claim, such a rule is very difficult to discern 
from this Court's existing case law. This important point should 
be clarified for the lower courts. 
The issue posed by this case and as of yet unaddressed 
by this Court is as follows: are military personnel, who are act-
ing in a fashion "incident to military service," Peres, barred 
from bringing an PTCA action against the federal government for 
the negligence of non-military "government employees"? 
~
CAll has 
held that military personnel are not so barred. I think that the 
question is important enough to be answered by this Court. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend granting cert. 
There is a response. 
August 11, 1986 Westfall Opin in petn. 
Court ...................... . ..... :. .... . Voted on ................... ~ ........ , 19 .... . . 
Argued ............................... . , 19 ..... . Assigned .. ......... .................. , 19 .. .. . . No. 85-2039 
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~ P~ - -r~l ~ ad-: 
Justice Powell January 8, 1987 ~ S? ~ 
Leslie e:v ~~-~--~ \) 
No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson 
Cert. to CAll (en bane) 
tiL-(~ 
(Johnson, Tjoflat, Roney, Hill, diss.) 
Tuesday, Feb. 24, 1987 Cthird argument) 
I. Summary 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
doctrine of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), 
bars an action on behalf of a serviceman whose decedent al-
leges that an FAA flight controller was negligent in guiding 
the helicopter that the serviceman was piloting. 
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II. Background 
Resp's husband, Horton Johnson, was a helico~ 
pilot in the Coast Guard, stationed in Hawaii. On Jan. 7, 
1982, Johnson was dispatched to search for a civilian boat 
in distress. Because bad whether made visual navigation 
impossible, Johnson requested the civilian FAA controllers 
to assume positive radar control over the helicopter. The 
controllers did so, and directed the helicopter into the 
side of a mountain. Johnson was killed in the crash. --------Resp brought his action on behalf of herself, her 
children, and her husband's estate, alleging negligence on 
the part of the civilian air traffic controllers. The Gov-
ernment filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since resp's 
decedent was killed while acting within the course and scope 
of his military duties, the complaint failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Th~C agreed, citing Fe res, and 
dismissed the action. A panel of the CAll. reversed. ---, ------
CAll voted to hear the case en bane, ~nd reinstated the 
The C /}II /J~ 
pan- cl-~ b--~ 
~~ el opinion. 
d..u-1 ~-r 
The CAll undertook a lengthy examination of the 
Feres doctrine, concluding that "[r]egardless of the 'wide-
spread, almost universal critic ism of Fe res by the lower 
federal courts and commentators,' it nonetheless 'is beyond 
question that it is the law.'" (numerous citations omit-
ted). The CAll then proceeded to apply the doctrine. Resp 
argued that the inquiry under the Feres doctrine should be 
page 3. 
limited to whether the maintenance of the suit would have a 
disruptive effect on military discipline. The Government 
argues that the Feres doctrine bars suit whenever a service----____., 
man is killed in the course of military service. The CAll 
declined to adopt either of these approaches and instead 
found the key to the case to be that the suit was based on 
civilian negligence. According to the CAll: 
[N) early all the cases decided by referen 
Feres involved the typical Feres factual aradig 
-- an FTCA suit for injuries of death al y 
caused "by the negligence of a serviceman or an 
employee of the armed forces. _._. • As we see it, 
the teaching of Feres and its progeny .•. is that 
when the Feres factual paradigm is present, the 
issue is whether the injury arose out of or during 
the course of an activity incident to service ..•• 
If, however, the alleged tortfeasor is not a mem-
ber of the armed forces or a civilian employee 
engaged in activities usually associated with the 
armed forces, we conclude that a court should con-
sult the Feres doctrine rationales as set forth in 
Stencel "to determine to what extent, if any, the 
allowance of [the] claim would circumvent the pur-
poses of the [FTCA] as construed by the 
[Supreme] court." 
Under this analysis, the court found that the Feres 
doctrine did nc_:t bar r ... esp's FTCA suit. It found the doc-
trine "best explained by the desire to avoid civilian court 
inquiry into matters that the Supreme Court views as best 
left beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny." The court found 







remotely connected with the military will be ~~­
~u 
The court~ this case proceeds to trial." 
found no encroachment on the military discipline structure ~~ 
and thus no reason to bar the suit. 
page 4. 
The CAll acknowledged the conflicting decision of 
the CA9 in Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 1044 (1980). In that case, a 
Navy lieutenant flying home on leave as a military space 
available passenger aboard an Air Force transport was killed 
when it crashed into a mountain. His wife brought a FTCA 
action against the Government and three air traffic control-
lers. The CA9 concluded that the lieutenant was killed 
while engaged in activity incident to service and held that 
the Fe res doctrine barred suit. The CA9 found that the 
Supreme Court has never limited the applicability of the 
Feres doctrine to suits involving a threat to military dis-
cipline, and that the focus of the doctrine should be on the 
serviceman's military status, not the status of the 
tortfeasor. The CAll found Uptegrove "wrongly decided" and 
expressly declined to follow it. 
The [A~~-3oted the intervening decision by 
this Court in Shearer v. United States, 105 s. Ct. 321 ~ 
(1984). It found the decision to be "helpful to [the] deci-
sion" and to "reinforc[e] the analysis set forth in the pan-
el opinion." The section of the opinion discussing the 
Feres doctrine was joined by eight justices (you did not 
participate). That section placed special emphasis on the 
importance of ~Tlitary - discipli~V The CAll concluded: 
The claims presented are based solely upon the 
conduct of civilian employees of the FAA who were 
not in any way involved in military activities. 
. .. 
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the fact that the decedent was a helicopter pilot 
for the United States Coast Guard is not suffi-
cient, stanoing alone, to activate Feres preclu-
sion. 
Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, dis- 1f1 ~ ------- _ ______..... ~ ~
sented. The dissent found that the Feres doctrine exempts 
~vernment from suit when the injury to a serviceman is ~~ 
~ .3~ 




had ignored binding precedent in reaching its result. It 
found the military status of the alleged tortfeasor to be 
immaterial since the FTCA applies to "the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government." 
Thus, the true Feres factual paradigm is a case in which 
injury to a serviceman is caused by ~government employee. 
This would apply to this case. 
III. Analysis 
Both the Government and resp find support for their 
position in this Court's previous cases. A chronological 
review of these cases indicates the development of the doc------trine. 
A. Relevant Precedent 
In Brooks v. United States, 337 u.s. 49 Cl949), the 
Court addressed a case in which two off-duty servicemen were 
killed and injured in a car accident due to the negligence 
of a civilian Army employee driving an Army truck on a pub-
lie highway. The Court characterized the injury suffered as 
not incident to service and allowed recovery. According to 
the Court: 
The Government envisages dire consequences 
should we [allow recovery]. A battle commander's 
poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, a 
defective jeep which causes injury, all would 
ground tort actions against the United States. 
But we are dealing with an accident which had 
nothing to do with the [servicemen's] army ca-
reers, injuries not caused by their service except 
in the sense that all human events depend upon 
what has already transpired. Were the accident 
incident to the [servicemen's] service, a wholly 
different case would be presented. 
page 6. 
Id., at 52. The Court did not find the fact that the serv-
icemen and their beneficiaries would receive veteran's bene-
fits dispositive. Instead, it found that the amount re-
ceived in benefits could be considered in determining recov-
ery under the FTCA. 
~ In Feres v. United States, 340 u.s. 135 (1950), a 
serviceman died in a fire in army barracks, and his wife 
brought suit alleging that the Government was negligent in 
quartering him in barracks known to be unsafe. The Court 
decided three cases together. The common fact underlying 
all three cases was that "each claimant, while on active 
duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to negligence 
of others in the armed forces." Id., at 138. The Court 
broadly stated, "We know of no American law which ever has 
permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against 
either his superior officers of the Government he is serv-
ing." Id., at 141. The Court concluded that "the Govern-
ment is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
page 7. 
are in the course of activity incident to service." Id., at 
146. 
In ~ed States v. Brown, 348 u.s. 110 (1954), a 
discharged veteran brought suit for negligent treatment of 
his knee in a Veteran's Administration Hospital. The knee 
injury occurred while the veteran was on active duty and led 
to his honorable discharge. The Court noted: 
The Feres decision did not disapprove of the 
Brooks case. It merely distinguished it, holding 
that the Tort Claims Act does not cover 'injuries 
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice.' •.. The peculiar and special relationship of 
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the 
maintenance of such suits on di~i£line, and the 
extreme results that might obtainl.r suits under 
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent 
orders given or negligent acts committed in the 
course of military duty, led the Court to read 
that Act as excluding claims of that character. 
Id., at 112. The Court viewed Brown as governed by Brooks, 
not Feres. The injury for which suit was brought did not 
occur while the serviceman was on active duty or subject to 
military discipline. Moreover, the type of claim was not 
foreign to the broad pattern of liability the Government 
undertook in the FTCA. The Court affirmed that while Con-
gress could have made veteran's benefits an exclusive reme-
dy, it had not done so. Consequently, the availability of 
the benefits does not preclude suit. The Court "adhere[d) 
to the line drawn in the Feres case between injuries 
that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the 
course of military duty," finding that this injury did not 
arise out of the course of military duty. Id., at 113. 
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In~d States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 !1963), the 
Court held that a federal prisoner could sue under the FTCA 
for personal injuries suffered in prison due to the negli-
gence of a government employee. The Government argued in 
that case that the Feres doctrine should preclude suit. The 
Court rejected this argument. The Court articulated the 
reasons behind the Feres doctrine: 
(1) the absence of an analogous or parallel li-
ability, on the part of either an individual or a 
State; no individual has power to mobilize a mili-
tia, no State had been held liable to its militia-
men; (2) the presence of a comprehensive compen-
sation system for service personnel; C3) the 
dearth of private bills from the military; (4) 
the distinctly federal relationship of the soldier 
to his superiors and the Government, which should 
not be disturbed by state laws; and (5) the 
variations in state law to which soldiers would be 
subjected, involuntarily, since they have no 
choice in where they go. 
Id., at 159. The Court stated that Feres is "best ex-
plained" by the adverse effect on military discipline that 
would resu~rom such suits. 
In Stence 
431 u.s. 666 a National Guard officer brought suit 
for an injury when the ejection system of his 
fighter aircraft malfunctioned during a midair emergency. 
The officer sued the United States and the government con-
tractor who manufactured the faulty system. The contractor 
cross-claimed against the Government, alleging that the mal-
function was due to faulty specifications and components 
supplied by the Government. The question presented in 
Stencel was whether the right of a third party to recover 
9~ -
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from the Government in an indemnity action is limited by the 
Fe res doctrine. The Court concluded that "the third-party 
indemnity action in this case is unavailable for essentially 
the same reasons that the direct action . . . is barred by 
Feres." Id., at 673. 
This time, the Court identified 
behind the Feres decision. First, 
the Government and servicemen is "distinctly federal in 
character". Thus, the Government's liability to service 
members should not depend upon the vagaries of state law. 
Second, servicemen are subject to a no-fault compensation 
system. For the first time, the Court stated that "the mil-
itary compensation scheme provides an upper limit of liabil-
ity for the Government as to service-connected injuries." 
Id., at 673. Third, the suits would disrupt military disci-
pline. The Court found the effect of a third-party suit on 
military discipline to be the same as a direct suit. 
In 462 u.s. 296 (1983), Navy 
enlisted his superior officers, 
alleging that they discriminated against the men on the 
basis of race in making duty assignments and performance 
evaluations. The Court reiterated that Feres seems best 
explained by the military discipline rationale, concluding 
"Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long be-
fore entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with 
the enlisted personnel and their superior officers; that 
relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique 
page 10. 
structure of the Military Establishment." Id., at 300. The 
Court thus concluded that enlisted military personnel were 
not entitled to bring a Bivens action against their superior 
officers. 
Most recently, the Court decided ~ted States v. ......___ _____ _ 
Shearer, 105 s. Ct. 3039 (1985). In that case, an Army pri-
1 I -------r---
vate was kidnapped and killed by a fellow servicemari while 
The private's mother brought suit against the 
Government, alleging that the Army negligently failed to 
exercise sufficient control over the killer, whom it knew to 
be dangerous. The Court found that Feres barred the suit. 
The Court reiterated that the military discipline rationale 
is the primary reason behind Feres. It noted that the lower 
court had placed emphasis on the fact that the private was 
off duty and away from the base when he was murdered. The 
Court stated, "[T] he situs of the murder is not nearly as 
important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to 
second-guess military decisions, and whether the suit 
might impair essential military discipline." Id., at 3043. 
The suit at issue went to the heart of these concerns. It 
"call[ed] into question basic choices about the discipline, 
supervision, and control of a serviceman." Ibid. The Court 
distinguished Brooks, "Unlike the negligence alleged in the 
operation of a vehicle, the claim here would require Army 
officers 'to testify in court as to each other's decisions 
and actions."' Id., at 3044. 
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B. Application 
The present case involves an on-duty serviceman 
whose death occurred while he was on a mission directed by 
his superiors. Under the broad language of Feres, his inju-
ry arose "out of or in the course of activity incident to 
service." 340 U.S., at 146. Some of the rationales articu-
lated in this Court's previous decision would apply to this 
case.~~maintenance of th~pe of suit would subject 
the Government and servicemen to the vagaries of state law. 
~, resp has applied for and received the statutory vet-
~ ·------- -eran's benefits for her husband's death. If the "military 
compensation scheme" truly "provides an upper limit of li-
ability for the Government as to service-connected inju-
ries," Stencel, 431 U.S., at 673, then resp's suit may be 
precluded. 
The counterargument is that what has consistently 
been identified as the primary rationale for Feres -- dis-
ruption of military discipline -- is arguably not present in 
It ~.J. L-t..> 
does not involve second~ng of command decisions, and dL'9~ 
1="/1 A 
this case. The suit is against FAA flight controllers. 
does not involve the assessment of how any essentially mili-~~ 
- ~-~-
~~ 
to any civilian who demonstrated flight controller negli-
~· 
tary action was performed. The Government would be liable 
gence. Thus, this suit does not subject the Government to /3 ~ /V~ 
unique liability. v-s J4t L( ~ 
,__- ----, 
The Government argues that maintenance of this type 
of suit would indeed disrupt military discipline. It argues 
page 12. 
that FAA personnel are often called upon to advise the mili-
tary and assist in directing military missions. According-
ly, inquiry into their conduct would disrupt the important 
working relationship between the FAA and the military. 1 The 
Government also argues that a jury could not evaluate the 
conduct of the flight controllers without considering the 
military nature of the mission involved. "At trial, the 
United States would be required to show that the air traffic 
controllers acted reasonably, which might require testimony 
describing the hazardous nature of the conditions, the dan-
ger involved in the particular rescue mission, and the 
pressing need to fly in weather not suited for civilian air-
craft." Brief for United States 18. It argues that this 
type of case would involve questions of contributory negli-
gence, requiring servicemen to testify against each other in 
court. 
I ( '-' 
There appears to be a strong need for a clear rule 
in this area. ~~ clear ru~ is advocated by the Government 
a suit respecting any injury incurred during the course 
of military service is barred. The CAll adopted a different 
lThis argument is very similar to the Government's argument in 
military contractor cases, which comprise a subset of the Feres 
doc r1ne cases. rt has recently granted cert in a case to 
determine the extent of the so-called "military contractor 
defense". The lower courts have generally held that where the 
Government participates substantially in the manufacture and 
design of military equipment, the contractor shares the 
Government's immunity from a suit brought by a serviceman injured 
by the product. You will be recused from consideration of this 
case. 
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clear rule -- a suit respecting an injury incurred during 
~
the course of military service is barred if the tortfeasor 
is also a member of the rnili tary. If the tortfeasor is a 
civilian, a case-by-case analysis according to the ratio-
nales of Peres is required. 
The f overnrnent-;s --~~ has the virtue of being c~r­
er. The Government's rule encompasses· all cases in which ,....... 
the military discipline concern is present. Since it bars 
practically all suits by servicemen, it also bars almost all 
cases in which the injured party receives statutory service-
men's compensation. In addition, it precludes to a greater 
extent the possibility that the Government's relationship 
with its servicemen will be influenced by different state 
laws. 
The ~All~ s ~ is more narrowly tailored to address 
the military discipline concern. It bars all cases in which 
--~ 
the concern is most likely to be present -- suits against 
military personnel for injuries arising out of service. For 
all other cases, it requires a case-by-case determination, 
ostensibly according to all Peres factors, but presumably 
pr irnar ily according to the rnili tary discipline rationale. 
Thus, the CAll's rule would allow some servicemen's suits 
despite the fact that the servicemen received statutory corn-
pensation and despite the fact that state law would some-
times determine a serviceman's recovery from the Government. 
A reasoned decision could be written either way in 





this case. On balance, the Government's proposed rule sirn- )~ 
~ ~ .... 




ply appears too broad. 2 The Government's rule would seem to 
mean that a serviceman who is driving on a public street to 
deliver a package for his commander and who is struck by a 
post office vehicle driven recklessly at 90 m.p.h. would not 
be able to bring suit against the Government to recover dam-
ages. This result does not appear correct. This Court has 
consistently stated that the \~ary di~pli~ rationa~ 
is the primary basis for the Feres doctrine. The CAll rule 
appears consistent with this emphasis. The CAll's rule bars] (;0 1 ;'s 
all suits where military discipline is genuinely endangered. ~ 
It allows suits where military discipline is only a specula-
tive concern. 
A further refinement on the CAll's rule may be ap- ]3J q_ 
propriate. The other rationales for the Feres doctrine have~ 
been mentioned, but not emphasized in the Court's recent 
opinions. The clearest route may be to state that the ef-
feet on military discipline is the controlling consideration 
under Feres. Thus, where a serviceman sues military person-
nel, suit would be barred~ where a serviceman sues nonmili-
tary personnel, a court would have to determine whether the 
suit would endanger military discipline. Limiting the Feres 
considerations to military discipline would give lower 
2Resp argues that this Court in Shearer implicitly rejected the 
Government's position in the following statement: "The Feres 
I 
doctrine cannot be reduced t?,&_ few bright-line rules; each case 
must be examined in light of~ statute as it has been construed 
in Feres and subsequent cases." 105 S. Ct., at 3043. 
page 15. 
courts a clear basis upon which to evaluate numerous differ-
ent permutations of servicemen's claims. Because military 
personnel would be assured that suit would be barred whenev-
er their command decisions are at issue, they should not be 
chilled in conducting their military activities. 
The CAll's rule, which is admittedly less clear than -
the Government's bright-line rule, only has value if there 
--~~-·----
is a reason to allow suits on behalf of servicemen in cer-
-------- --~----------·-·----------
tain circumstances . One reason may be that civilians are 
...____.-----_ .. _.., 
allowed to recover damages for negligence, despite other 
available sources of compensation, and servicemen should be 
able to do the same absent the military discipline ration-
ale. Another reason may be that tort suits provide a check 
on individual and corporate behavior, and this check should 
be removed only when there are countervailing interests to 
be served. If these reasons are not convincing, the Govern-
ment's proposal may be the one to adopt. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Government argues that the Feres doctrine should 
bar suit for any injury incurred in the course of military --
service. This is a broad rule that bars almost all suits 
~ought by servicemen. The ~All refine~the Feres doctrine/~ 
to y o~ those suits brought against military ~~ -
personnel. Other suits would be evaluated by the policy ~---concerns articulated in Feres. A further refinement on the 
CAll's approach would be to evaluate claims against nonmili-
page 16. 
tary personnel only according to the effect on military dis-
cipline. 
The CAll's approach is the one to adopt if the ef-
feet on military discipline is the primary concern under 
Feres. This approach would allow suits that only marginally 
implicated the conduct of military affairs. In contrast, if 
the other rationales supporting the Fe res doctrine reh.ain 
vitality, e.g., that suits between servic~~en and the Gov-
ernrnent should not be subject to conflicting state laws and -......._...... ----- -------......__ _______ _ 
that the comprehensive benefits received by servicemen 
should be exclusive, then the broader rule proposed by the 
Government is the appropriate standard. 

I • 
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JUSTICE SCALIA ~~ ~ 
lfp/ss 03/14/87 JOHNSON SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Leslie DATE: March 14 , 19 8 7 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-2039 United States v. Johnson 
First, my thanks for giving me your March 13 
first draft so promptly. I gave it an initial review last 
night, and, subject to what is said below, think your 
draft is quite an achievement of quality writing in a 
short period of time. 
The first 25 pages of the draft seem a bit long. 
These pages are devoted primarily to a review of the 
relevant precedents and these are numerous - including CA 
decisions. Despite the length, I do not suggest any 
specific attempt to shorten this portion of the opinion. 
Indeed, I think we are justified in leaving it 
substantially as you have drafted it. 
I do have some difficulty with III-B (pp. 24-35). 
The problem arises primarily from what was said in United 
States v. Shearer, our most recent relevant decision. 
That case can be read as a significant departure from the 
rationale of the long line of prior decisions. It did say 
that "Fe res seems best explained" by the military 
2. 
discipline rationale, and that the other grounds for the 
Feres are "no longer controlling ••• " But, as you point 
out, there is a difference between saying that certain 
grounds are "no longer controlling", and saying that these 
grounds are no longer relevant at all. As you note, two 
of the original Feres grounds were repeated in Shearer. 
I think Subpart B is too long. Also, it seems to 
me that it is a mistake to focus primarily on the 
"military discipline basis" that may not have been 
mentioned until Stencel Aero and more recently in Shearer. 
We do not have to assume that "military discipline" is now 
the primary rationale for denying Tort Claims Act suits. 
See my suggested rider, p. 22, in which I comment on 
Shearer. I think we properly can view the reference to 
"military discipline" as being made in the broadest sense 
that is applicable, at least potentially, in all of these 
cases. I would come back repeatedly to Justice Jackson's 
conclusion in Feres that the government is not liable for 
injuries "to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to service". The 
entire military service depends, of course, on discipline, 
and in this case Johnson was obeying orders directly 
pertinent to Coast Guard service when he flew this 
3. 
helicoper mission. The language in Shearer, as well as in 
Stencel is not inconsistent with this view. 
Military discipline, of course, 





said, in this case, that Johnson was acting pursuant to 
military discipline when he properly relied on the service 
provided by another federal agency. Indeed, he would have 
violated discipline had he ignored the availability of 
this service and crashed at some other place. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 03/17/87 JOHN SALLY-POW 
ME.t-10RANDU M 
TO: Leslie DATE: March 17, 1987 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
85-2039 United States v. Johnson 
Your revision of pages 23 to the first paragraph 
on p. 32 is excellent. I continue to have some 
difficulty with the treatment of the ~military discipline" 
language in Shearer, beginning with the first paragraph on 
p. 32 through p. 36. 
This portion of the draft seems to accept the 
Shearer reference to "military discipline" as - in effect 
a holding that the basis of the Fe res doctrine is 
"military discipline". I do not think we need go this 
far. It seems to me that what you have said about Shearer 
in the paragraph that begins on p. 21 is almost all that 
need be said. Although the Court stated that Fe res is 
best explained by the 11 mil i tary discipline rationale 11 , 
Chief Justice Burger's opinion is explicit that Feres 
cannot be reduced to bright line rules, and he then 
identified additional rationales. See pp. 22, 23 of your 
draft. 
2. 
I would not use language (see p. 32) that appears 
to accept military discipline as the basis of the Fe res 
doctrine except in the broadest sense of that term. As we 
have discussed, discipline is at the core of military 
service, and the essence of discipline is that regulations 
and orders must be complied with unhesitatingly. In this 
case, Johnson was on duty and was acting pursuant to 
orders when he undertook the mission on which he was 
killed. 
I doubt the desirability of saying much more than 
the foregoing. I suggest that you omit the paragraph 
beginning on p. 32 and continuing through the top two 
lines of p. 35. Your cite to Hass on p. 34 is good but I 
believe I would omit this also. 
Footnote 12, with some revision, is helpful. 
I have suggested possible language changes in the 
paragraph that commences on p. 35, and - subject to your 
views - I am inclined to omit what you now have on p. 36. 
In other words, try ending the draft with language along 
the lines I suggest at the end of p. 35. I view the case 
as involving a command decision and a mission that - like 
all military missions implicates discipline in the 
broader sense of the term. 
3. 
* * * 
I hesitate to seem so positive, as I know that 
you have thought about this a good deal more than I have. 
I nevertheless have the feeling that Part III at present 
is wover arguedu, and also emphasizes problems that relate 
to litigation (see p. 33) that I think are rather 
unpersuasive. If the dissent requires it, we can use your 
ideas in rebuttal. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
,jtqtrtnu <!fou.d of tqt ~b ,jtatta 
'llaafrington. ~. <!f. 2ll.;tJ!.~. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Re: No. 85-2039-U.S. v. Johnson 
Dear Lewis: 
I await the dissent. 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 





..JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 
.ittp'rtmt Qj:.m:t of tlft ~ittb .itidts 
,rulfiqtcn. J. Qj:. 2ll~,.~ 
v 
March 24, 1987 
Re: No. 85-2039 - United States v. Johnson r 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In due course, I will circulate a dissent in the above case. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS Or 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.jtt¥ftntt ataud .ttf tqt ~ttitth .jta:b,« 
'Jila:,gltittgton,~. "t· 2llbi~~ . 
March 25, 1987 
Re: 85-2039 U.S. v. Johnson 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prtutt <!fltltrl of tqt ~b .§btftg 
Jfagfringhrn. ~. <!f. 2ll~~~ 
March 26, 1987 
Re: 85-2039 - United States v. Johnson 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upuutt ~llltrt llf tJr~ Jlnit~lt ~hrl~g 
Jfa,glfiugt&tn, ~. ~· 20,?~~ 
March 26, 1987 
Re: 85-2039 - United States v. Johnson 
Dear Lewis: 




Copies to the Conference 
\ 
CHAMBERS OF 
,jttpttutt <!f.rttrlltf tfrt Jn±ttb ,jtatt.&' 
~fringtmt. ~.<If. 2ll.;t~~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE March 31, 1987 
85-2039 - United States v. Johnson 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMBE R S OF" 
JUSTI CE HAR R Y A . BLAC KM U N 
~JtVUlttt ~ourl of tlft ~ttittb _itaf.tg 
._,uJringto:u:. ~. ~· 2ll?Jl..;l 
Re: No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. I must confess that I 
understand footnote 9 on page 7. Would you 
clarifying it or omitting it altogether? 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 




JUSTICE W~< . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
..ittpTtutt ClJttttrl ttl tift ~b Jtaftg 
~u~ ~. ctJ. 2llbi~~ 
May 6, 1987 
No. 85-2039 
United States v. Johnson 
Dear Nino, 
Thanks so very much. Please join 
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,u:prtnu <!Jttnrl of tlrt ~ttb ~brltlf 
:JlmrJrin:ghtn, ~. <!J. 2Ll~~~ 
May 5, 1987 
Re: 85-2039 - United States v. Johnson 
Dear Nino: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Scalia 
Copies to the Conference 
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From: Justice Scalia 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: · MAY 9 19a l 
SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-2039 
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. FRIEDA JOYCE 
JOHNSON, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF HORTON WINFIELD JOHNSON, DECEASED, 
ETC., ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1987] 
JusTICE ScALIA, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and Jus- I 
TICE STEVENS join, dissenting. \ 
As it did almost four decades ago in Feres v. United States, 
340 U. S. 135 (1950), the Court today provides several rea-
sons why Congress might have been wise to exempt from the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 
2671-2680, certain claims brought by servicemen. The prob-
lem now, as then, is that Congress not only failed to provide 
such an exemption, but quite plainly excluded it. We have 
not been asked by the respondent here to overrule Feres; but 
I can perceive no reason to accept the petitioner's invitation 
to extend it as the Court does today. 
I 
Much of the sovereign immunity of the United States was 
swept away in 1946 with passage of the FTCA, which ren-
ders the Government liable 
"for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, 
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United 
2 
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States, if a private person, would be liable to the claim-
ant in accordance with the law of the place where the act 
or omission occurred." 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b). 
Read as it is written, this language renders the United States 
liable to all persons, including servicemen, injured by the 
negligence of government employees. Other provisions of 
the Act set forth a number of exceptions, but none generally 
precludes FTCA suits brought by servicemen. One, in fact, 
excludes "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities 
of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during 
time of war," § 2680(j) (emphasis added), demonstrating that 
Congress specifically considered, and provided what it 
thought needful for, the special requirements of the military. 
There was no proper basis for us to supplement-i. e., re-
vise-that congressional disposition. 
In our first encounter with an FTCA suit brought by a ser-
viceman, we gave effect to the plain meaning of the statute. 
In Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49 (1949), military per-
sonnel had been injured in a collision with an Army truck 
while off duty. We rejected the Government's argument 
that those injured while enlisted in the military can never re-
cover under the FTCA. We noted that the Act gives the 
District Courts "jurisdiction over any claim founded on negli-
gence brought against the United States" and found the Act's 
exceptions "too lengthy, specific, and close to the present 
problem" to permit an inference that, notwithstanding the lit-
eral language of the statute, Congress intended to bar all 
suits brought by servicemen. I d., at 51. Particularly in 
light of the exceptions for claims arising out of combatant ac-
tivities, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(j), and in foreign countries, 
§ 2680(k), we said, "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Con-
gress did not have the servicemen in mind" in passing the 
FTCA. 337 U. S., at 51. We therefore concluded that the 
plaintiffs in Brooks could sue under the Act. In dicta, how-
ever, we cautioned that an attempt by a serviceman to re-
cover for injuries suffered "incident to ... service" would 
.. 
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present "a wholly different case," id., at 52, and that giving 
effect to the "literal language" of the FTCA in such a case 
might lead to results so "outlandish" that recovery could not 
be permitted, id., at 53. 
That "wholly different case" reached us one year later in 
Feres. We held that servicemen could not recover under the 
FTCA for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of 
activity incident to service," 340 U. S., at 146, and gave 
three reasons for our holding. First, the parallel private li-
ability required by the FTCA was absent. ld., at 141-142. 
Second, Congress could not have intended that local tort law 
govern the "distinctively federal" relationship between the 
Government and enlisted personnel. ld., at 142-144. 
Third, Congress could not have intended to make FTCA suits 
available to servicemen who have already received veterans' 
benefits to compensate for injuries suffered incident to serv-
ice. ld., at 144-145. Several years after Feres we thought 
of a fourth rationale: Congress could not have intended to 
permit suits for service-related injuries because they would 
unduly interfere with military discipline. United States v. 
Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954). 
In my view, none of these rationales justifies the result. 
Only the first of them, the "parallel private liability" argu-
ment, purports to be textually based, as follows: The United 
States is liable under the FTCA "in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances," 28 U. S.C. §2674; since no "private individual" 
can raise an army, and since no state has consented to suits 
by members of its militia, § 2674 Shields the Government 
from liability in the Feres situation. 340 U. S., at 141-142. 
Under this reasoning, of course, many of the Act's exceptions 
are superfluous, since private individuals typically do not, for 
example, transmit postal matter, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b), col-
lect taxes or customs duties, § 2680(c), impose quarantines, 
§ 2680(f), or regulate the monetary system,§ 2680(i). In any 
event, we subsequently recognized our error and rejected 
85-2039-DISSENT 
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Feres's "parallel private liability" rationale. See Rayonier, 
Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian 
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 66-69 (1955). 
Perhaps without that scant (and subsequently rejected) 
textual support, which could be pointed to as the embodiment 
of the legislative intent that its other two rationales specu-
lated upon, the Feres Court would not as an original matter 
have reached the conclusion that it did. Be that as it may, 
the speculation outlived the textual support, and the Feres 
rule is now sustained only by three disembodied estimations 
of what Congress must (despite what it enacted) have in-
tended. They are bad estimations at that. The first of 
them, Feres's second rationale, has barely escaped the fate of 
the "parallel private liability" argument, for though we have 
not yet acknowledged that it is erroneous we have described 
it as "no longer controlling." United States v. Shearer, 473 
U. S. 52, 58, n. 4 (1985). The rationale runs as follows: Li-
ability under the FTCA depends upon "the law of the place 
where the [negligent] act or omission occurred," 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1346(b); but Congress could not have intended local, and 
therefore geographically diverse, tort law to control impor-
tant aspects of the "distinctively federal" relationship be-
tween the United States and enlisted personnel. 340 U. S., 
at 142-144. Feres itself was concerned primarily with the 
unfairness to the soldier of making his recovery turn upon 
where he was injured, a matter outside of his control. /d., 
at 142-143. Subsequent cases, however, have stressed the 
military's need for uniformity in its governing standards. 
See, e. g., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 
431 U. S. 666, 672 (1977). Regardless of how it is under-
stood, this second rationale is not even a good excuse in pol-
icy, much less in principle, for ignoring the plain terms of the 
FTCA. 
The unfairness to servicemen of geographically varied re-
covery is, to speak bluntly, an absurd justification, given 
that, as we have pointed out in another context, nonuniform 
85-2039--DISSENT 
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recovery cannot possibly be worse than (what Feres pro-
vides) uniform nonrecovery. See United States v. Muniz, 
374 U. S. 150, 162 (1963). We have abandoned this peculiar 
rule of solicitude in allowing federal prisoners (who have no 
more control over their geographical location than service-
men) to recover under the FTCA for injuries caused by the 
negligence of prison authorities. See ibid. There seems to 
me nothing "unfair" about a rule which says that, just as a 
serviceman injured by a negligent civilian must resort to 
state tort law, so must a serviceman injured by a negligent 
government employee. 
To the extent that the rationale rests upon the military's 
need for uniformity, it is equally unpersuasive. To begin 
with, that supposition of congressional intent is positively 
contradicted by the text. Several of the FTCA's exemptions 
show that Congress considered the uniformity problem, see, 
e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2680(b), 2680(i), 2680(k), yet it chose to 
retain sovereign immunity for only some claims affecting the 
military. § 2680(j). Moreover, we have effectively dis-
avowed this "uniformity" justification-and rendered its 
benefits to military planning illusory- by permitting service-
men to recover under the FTCA for injuries suffered not inci-
dent to service, and permitting civilians to recover for inju-
ries caused by military negligence. See, e. g., Indian 
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955). Finally, it 
is difficult to explain why uniformity (assuming our rule were 
achieving it) is indispensable for the military, but not for the 
many other federal departments and agencies that can be 
sued under the FTCA for the negligent performance of their 
"unique, nationwide function[s]," Stencel Aero Engineering 
Corp. v. United States, supra, at 675 (MARSHALL, J., dis-
senting), including, as we have noted, the federal prison sys-
tem which may be sued under varying state laws by its in-
mates. See United States v. Muniz, supra. In sum, the 
second Feres rationale, regardless of how it is understood, is 
not a plausible estimation of congressional intent, much less a 
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justification for importing that estimation, unwritten, into 
the statute. 
Feres's third basis has similarly been denominated "no 
longer controlling." United States v. Shearer, supra, at 58, 
n. 4. Servicemen injured or killed in the line of duty are 
compensated under the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA), 72 
Stat. 1118, as amended, 38 U. S.C. §301 et seq. (1982 ed. 
and Supp. III), and the Feres Court thought it unlikely that 
Congress meant to permit additional recovery under the 
FTCA, 340 U. S., at 144-145. Feres described the absence 
of any provision to adjust dual recoveries under the FTCA 
and VBA as "persuasive [evidence] that there was no aware-
ness that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for 
injuries incident to military service." I d., at 144. Since 
Feres we have in dicta characterized recovery under the 
VBA as "the sole remedy for service-connected injuries," 
Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 464 
(1980) (per curiam), and have said that the VBA "provides an 
upper limit of liability for the Government" for those injuries, 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 
673. 
The credibility of this rationale is undermined severely by 
the fact that both before and after Feres we permitted in-
jured servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they had 
been compensated under the VBA. In Brooks v. United 
States, 337 U. S. 49 (1949), we held that two servicemen in-
jured off duty by a civilian Army employee could sue the Gov-
ernment. The fact that they had already received VBA 
benefits troubled us little. We pointed out that "nothing in 
the Tort Claims Act or the veterans' laws . . . provides for 
exclusiveness of remedy" and we refused to "call either rem-
edy . . . exclusive ... when Congress has not done so." I d., 
at 53. We noted further that Congress had included three 
exclusivity provisions in the FTCA, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2672, 
2676, 2679, but had said nothing about servicemen plaintiffs, 
337 U. S., at 53. We indicated, however, that VBA com-
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pensation could be taken into account in adjusting recovery 
under the FTCA. I d., at 53-54; see also United States v. 
Brown, 348 U. S., at 111, and n. *. That Brooks remained 
valid after Feres was made clear in United States v. Brown, 
supra, in which we stressed again that because "Congress 
had given no indication that it made the right to compensa-
tion [under the VBA] the veteran's exclusive remedy, ... 
the receipt of disability payments ... did not preclude recov-
ery under the Tort Claims Act." Id., at 113. 
Brooks and Brown (neither of which has ever been ex-
pressly disapproved) plainly hold that the VBA is not an "ex-
clusive" remedy which places an "upper limit" on the Govern-
ment's liability. Because of Feres and today's decision, 
however, the VBA will in fact be exclusive for service-con-
nected injuries, but not for others. Such a result can no 
more be reconciled with the text of the VBA than with that of 
the FTCA, since the VBA compensates servicemen without 
regard to whether their injuries occur "incident to service" as 
Feres defines that term. See 38 U. S. C. § 105. Moreover, 
the VBA is not, as Feres assumed, identical to federal and 
state workers' compensation statutes in which exclusivity 
provisions almost invariably appear. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. 
§ 8116(c). Recovery is possible under workers' compensa-
tion statutes more often than under the VBA, and VBA 
benefits can be terminated more easily than can workers' 
compensation. -8ee Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should 
Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 
Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1106-1108 (1979). In sum, "the pres-
ence of an alternative compensation system [neither] explains 
[n]or justifies the Feres doctrine; it only makes the effect of 
the doctrine more palatable." Hunt v. United States, 204 
U. S. App. D. C. 308, 326, 636 F. 2d 580, 598 (1980). 
The foregoing three rationales-the only ones actually re-
lied upon in Feres-are so frail that it is hardly surprising 
that we have repeatedly cited the later-conceived-of "military 
discipline" rationale as the "best" explanation for that deci-
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sion. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 57; Chap-
pell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 (1983); United States v. 
Muniz, 374 U. S., at 162. Applying the FTCA as written 
would lead, we have reasoned, to absurd results, because if 
suits could be brought on the basis of alleged negligence to-
wards a serviceman by other servicemen, military discipline 
would be undermined and civilian courts would be required to 
second-guess military decisionmaking. See Stencel Aero 
Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S., at 671-672, 
673. (Today the Court goes further and suggests that per-
mitting enlisted men and women to sue their Government on 
the basis of negligence towards them by any government em-
ployee seriously undermines "duty and loyalty to one's serv-
ice and to one's country." Ante, at 9.) I cannot deny the 
possibility that some suits brought by servicemen will ad-
versely affect military discipline, and if we were interpreting 
an ambiguous statute perhaps we could take that into ac-
count. But I do not think the effect upon military discipline 
is so certain, or so certainly substantial, that we are justified 
in holding (if we can ever be justified in holding) that Con-
gress did not mean what it plainly said in the statute before 
us. 
It is strange that Congress' "obvious" intention to preclude 
Feres suits because of their effect on military discipline was 
discerned neither by the Feres Court nor by the Congress 
that enacted the FTCA (which felt it necessary expressly to 
exclude recovery for combat injuries). Perhaps Congress 
recognized that the likely effect of Feres suits upon military 
discipline is not as clear as we have assumed, but in fact has 
long been disputed. See Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Dis-
cipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 383, 
407-411 (1985). Or perhaps Congress assumed that the 
FTCA's explicit exclusions would bar those suits most threat-
ening to military discipline, such as claims based upon combat 
command decisions, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(j); claims based upon 
performance of "discretionary" functions, § 2680(a); claims 
85-2039-DISSENT 
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 9 
ar1smg in foreign countries, § 2680(k); intentional torts, 
§ 2680(h); and claims based upon the execution of a statute or 
regulation, § 2680(a). Or perhaps Congress assumed that, 
since liability under the FTCA is imposed upon the Govern-
ment, and not upon individual employees, military decision-
making was unlikely to be affected greatly. Or perhaps-
most fascinating of all to contemplate-Congress thought 
that barring recovery by servicemen might adversely affect 
military discipline. After all, the morale of Lieutenant Com-
mander Johnson's comrades-in-arms will not likely be 
boosted by news that his widow and children will receive only 
a fraction of the amount they might' have recovered had he 
been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time of his death. 
To the extent that reading the FTCA as it is written will 
require civilian courts to examine military decisionmaking 
and thus influence military discipline, it is outlandish to con-
sider that result "outlandish," Brooks v. United States, 337 
U. S., at 53, since in fact it occurs frequently, even under the 
Feres dispensation. If Johnson's helicopter had crashed into 
a civilian's home, the homeowner could have brought an 
FTCA suit that would have invaded the sanctity of military 
decisionmaking no less than respondents'. If a soldier is in-
jured not "incident to service," he can sue his Government re-
gardless of whether the alleged negligence was military neg-
ligence. And if a soldier suffers service-connected injury 
because of the negligence of a civilian (such as the manufac-
turer of an airplane), he can sue that civilian, even if the civil-
ian claims contributory negligence and subpoenas the ser-
viceman's colleagues to testify against him. 
In sum, neither the three original Feres reasons nor the 
post hoc rationalization of "military discipline" justifies our 
failure to apply the FTCA as written. Feres was wrongly 
decided and heartily deserves the "widespread, almost uni-
versal criticism" it has received. In re "Agent Orange" 
85-2039-DISSENT 
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Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 
(EDNY), appeal dism'd, 745 F. 2d 161 (CA2 1984). * 
II 
The Feres Court claimed its decision was necessary to 
make "the entire statutory system of remedies against the 
Government . . . a workable, consistent and equitable 
whole." 340 U. S., at 139. I am unable to find such beauty 
in what we have wrought. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal (similar to one presented by Judge Weinstein in In re 
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, supra, at 
1252): A serviceman is told by his superior officer to deliver 
some papers to the local United States Courthouse. As he 
nears his destination, a wheel on his government vehicle 
breaks, causing the vehicle to injure him, his daughter 
(whose class happens to be touring the Courthouse that day) 
and a United States marshal on duty. Under our case law 
and federal statutes, the serviceman may not sue the Govern-
ment (Feres); the guard may not sue the Government (be-
cause of the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees' 
*See, e. g., Sanchez v. United States, 813 F. 2d 593, - (CA2 1987); 
Bozeman v. United States, 780 F. 2d 198, 200 (CA2 1985); Hinkie v. 
United States, 715 F. 2d 96, 97 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1023 
(1984); Mondelli v. United States, 711 F. 2d 567, 569 (CA3 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U. S. 1021 (1984); Scales v. United States, 685 F. 2d 970, 974 
(CA5 1982),, cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1082 (1983); LaBash v. United States 
Dept. of Army, 668 F. 2d 1153, 1156 (CAlO), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 1008 
(1982); Monaco v. United States, 661 F. 2d 129, 132 (CA9 1981), cert. de-
nied, 456 U. S. 989 (1982); Hunt v. United States, 204 U. S. App. D. C. 
308, 317, 636 F. 2d 580, 589 (1980); Veillette v. United States, 615 F. 2d 
505, 506 (CA9 1980); Parker v. United States, 611 F. 2d 1007, 1011 (CA5 
1980); Peluso v. United States, 474 F. 2d 605, 606 (CA3), cert. denied, 414 
U. S. 879 (1973); Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weap-
ons of War, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 383 (1985); Hitch, The Federal Tort 
Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 316 (1954); Rhodes, 
The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. Rev. 24 (Spring 
1976); Note, 51 J. Air L. & Com. 1087 (1986); Note, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 391 
(1984); Note, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (1979); Note, 43 St. John's L. Rev. 455 
(1969). 
85-2039--DISSENT 
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 11 
Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U. S. C. § 8116); the daughter 
may not sue the Government for the loss of her father's 
companionship (Feres), but may sue the Government for her 
own injuries (FTCA). The serviceman and the guard may 
sue the manufacturer of the vehicle, as may the daughter, 
both for her own injuries and for the loss of her father's 
companionship. The manufacturer may assert contributory 
negligence as a defense in any of the suits. Moreover, the 
manufacturer may implead the Government in the daughter's 
suit (United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951)) 
and in the guard's suit (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United 
States, 460 U. S. 190 (1983)), even though the guard was 
compensated under a statute that contains an exclusivity pro-
vision (FECA). But the manufacturer may not implead the 
Government in the serviceman's suit (Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977)), even 
though the serviceman was compensated under a statute that 
does not contain an exclusivity provision (VBA). 
The point is not that all of these inconsistencies are attrib-
utable to Feres (though some of them assuredly are), but 
merely that bringing harmony to the law has hardly been the 
consequence of our ignoring what Congress wrote and imag-
ining what it should have written. When confusion results 
from our applying the unambiguous text of a statute, it is at 
least a confusion validated by the free play of the democratic 
process, rather than what we have here: unauthorized ratio-
nalization gone wrong. We realized seven years too late 
that "[t]here is no justification for this Court to read exemp-
tions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress. If 
the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body 
that adopted it." Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S., 
at 320 (footnote omitted). 
I cannot take comfort, as the Court does, ante, at 4-5, and 
n. 6, from Congress' failure to amend the FTCA to overturn 
Feres. The unlegislated desires of later Congresses with re-
gard to one thread in the fabric of the Federal Tort Claims 
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Act could hardly have any bearing upon the proper interpre-
tation of the entire fabric of compromises that their predeces-
sors enacted into law in 1946. And even if they could, intuit-
ing those desires from congressional failure to act is an 
uncertain enterprise which takes as its starting point disre-
gard of the checks and balances in the constitutional scheme 
of legislation designed to assure that not all desires of a ma-
jority of the Legislature find their way into law. l] 
We have not been asked by the respondents to overrule I 
Feres, and so need not resolve whether considerations of 
stare decisis should induce us, despite the plain error of the 
case, to leave bad enough alone. As the majority acknowl-
edges, however, "all of the cases decided by this Court under 
Feres have involved allegations of negligence on the part of 
members of the military." Ante, at 5. I would not extend 
Feres any further. I confess that the line between FTCA 
suits alleging military negligence and those alleging civilian 
negligence has nothing to recommend it except that it would 
limit our clearly wrong decision in Feres and confine the un-
fairness and irration lity that decision has bred. But that, I 
thinK, IS JUstification enou -...... 
Had Lieutenant Commander Johnson been piloting a com-
mercial helicopter when he crashed into the side of a moun-
tain, his widow and children could have sued and recovered 
for their loss. But because Johnson devoted his life to serv-
ing in his country's armed forces, the Court today limits his 
family to a fraction of the recovery they might otherwise 
have received. four Imposition of that sacrifice bore the le-
gitimacy of having been prescribed by the people's elected 
Representatives, it would (insofar as we are permitted to in-
quire into such things) be just. But it has not been, and it is 
not. I respectfully dissent. 
lfp/ss 05/09/87 . Rider A, p. ------ (Johnson) 
JOHNSONR SALLY-POW 
Justice Scalia argues that Feres "was clearly 
wrong", post, at 12, and his dissent would reject four 
decades of adherence to its doctrine. Arguing 
"unfairness" in this case, Justice Scalia assumes that had 
respondent been "piloting a commercial helicopter" his 
family would recover more in damages than it now may 
l recover under the benefit programs available for a 
serviceman and his family (cite). It hardly need be said 
that predicting the outcome of any damage suit - both with 
respect to liability and the amount of damages - is 
hazardous, whereas veterans' benefits are guaranteed by 
law. But, if "fairness" were the issue, one could respond 
to the dissent's assumption by noting that had the 
2 . 
negligent instructions that led to Johnson's ·death been 
given by another serviceman, the consequences - under the 
dissent's view- would . be equally "unfair". But apart 
from assumption, the dissent's reasoning largely . ignores 
the question that underlies the rationale of the Feres 
doctrine: whether the injury was "incident to service"? 
After all, respondent was a member of the Armed Services, 
and was engaged in performing a Coast Guard mission. 
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85-2039 United States v. Johnson 
This case is here from the Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit. 
In Feres v. United States, decided in 1950, 
this Court held that a member of the Armed Services/ 
killed or injured in an activity incident to that 
service,j could not sue the government under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. 
In this case, Lt. Commander Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot with the Coast Guard. While on a 
Coast Guard rescue mission, Johnson was killed when his 
helicopter crashed into a mountain. It is conceded 
that, in poor weather, flight controllers of the 
Federal Aviation Administration,j a civilian agency~had 
misdirected the helicopter. 
Johnson's wife, after receiving the statutory 
compensation, brought this suit under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act~seeking additional compensation for her 
husband's death. The District Court, relying on the 
Court's decision in Feres, dismissed her suit. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It found that 
the Feres doctrine should not apply where the 
2. 
negligence was by a civilian government employee~rather 
than by another member of the military service. 
For the reasons stated in an opinion filed 
today, we reverse. Since 1950, this Court consistently 
has applied the Feres doctrine~to bar suits based on 
injuries incurred incident to military service. It is 
not denied that Johnson was on a Coast Guard rescue 
missio~incident to his service. 
The widow has received the compensation 
provided by Congress. We find no reason to reject a 
doctrine / consistently followed since 1950, / and that 
Congress has not chosen to change. 
We therefore reaffirm the holding in Feres~ 
that the government is ~t liable~under the Tort 
Claims Act,j for injuries to service personnel ~hen the 
injuries occur in the course of activity/ incident to 
military duties. 
Justice Scalia has filed a dissenting opinion
1 
in which Justices Brennan, Marhsall and Stevens have 
joined. 
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No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson 
FIRST DRAFT 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents the question whether the doctrine 
established in Feres v. United States, 340 u.s. 135 
(1950), bars an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
on behalf of a serviceman killed during the course of an 
activity incident to service where the complaint alleges 




Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, 
stationed in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 
1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress 
lc/1./h 1:: ., .. .J 
call from a boat lost in the area. Johns~n . a~a several ~ 
I{ 
W-6 v 
~r Coast Guard members ~ dispatched to search for 
u J " 
the vessel. Inclement weather rendered visibility po~ 
~o Johnson requested radar assistance from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the 
federal government. The FAA controllers assumed positive 
radar control over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, 
the helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain on the 
island of Molokai. All the crew members, including 
Johnson, were killed in the crash. 
3 • 
Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received 
veterans' benefits as a result of her husband's death.l 
~~;I 
she filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), 28 u.s.c. §§1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint sought 
damages from the United States on the grounds that the FAA 
controllers negligently caused her husband's death. The 
Government filed a motion to dismiss, ~~ because 
A 
Johnson was killed during the course of his military 
duties, respondent could not recover damages from the 
United States. The District Court agreed and dismissed 
the complaint, relying exclusively on Peres. 
l~n~ received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 
~ death gratuity, and preaen~ receives approximately $868 per 
month in dependency and compensatory benefits. Brief for the 
United States 3, n. 1. 
~~~~~~ 
~l;s~, 





The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the holding of the District Court, finding that this 
Court's decision in Feres did not bar suit. 749 F. 2d 
1530, 1535 {1985). The Court of Appeals undertook a 
lengthy analysis of the evolution of the Feres doctrine. 
It noted that although the Court in Feres articulated 
numerous rationales for the doctrine,2 these had not all 
been consistently mentioned in subsequent cases. It 
observed, however, that this Court had applied three of 
the factors underlying the Feres decision in two recent 
cases, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 
u .t.' 
2The bases underlying the decision in F(f were; (J..l the 1 . , .,) 
absence of parallel private liability; ) the anomal~yf L~ 
applying various state law rules of 1 iabil ity to service n who 
have little control over their geographic location; { the 
"distinctively federal character" of the relationship between the 
Federal Government and servicemen; and (1 the existence of the 




431 u.s. 666 (1977) and Chappell v. Wallace, 462 u.s. 296 
(19S3). The Court thus concluded that despite apparent 
criticism of the Feres decision by lower courts and 
commentators, "it nonetheless 'is beyond question that it 
is the law.'" 749 F. 2d, 1535 (quoting Brown v. United 
States, 739 F. 2d 362, 365 (CAS 19S4) (quoting Laswell v. 
Brown, 6S3 F. 2d 261, 2675 (CAS 19S2), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 1210 
~ 
The court then ~oceeded &o discuss the application of 
1\ 
91-
the Feres doctrine to the facts of this case. ~rt 
noted the conflicting standards advocated by the parties 
as to when the Feres doctrine should apply. Respondent 
urged the court to "bite the bullet, so to speak, and 
jettison those rationales for the Feres doctrine ••. 
[other than] the effect maintenance of the suit would have 
6. 
on the military disciplinary structure." 749 F. 2d, at 
1535. Respondent argued that a claim "based solely on the 
conduct of civilians performing a civil ian service," id., 
at 1536, does not implicate this concern. The Government 
contended that the Peres doctrine bars recovery from the 
United States whenever a serviceman is injured in the 
course of his military service, regardless of whether the 
alleged tortfeasors are military or civilian employees of 
the Federal Government. 
~1-IY# ~ 
The  declined to adopt either of these positions 
in full. Instead, it identified what it termed "the 
typical Peres factual paradigm -- an FTCA suit for 
injuries or death allegedly caused by the negligence of a 
serviceman or an employee of the armed forces." Id., at 
153 7. It found: 
"[T] he teaching of Fe res and its progeny • • . is 
that when the Feres factual paradigm is present, 
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or 
during the course of an activity incident to 
service. See Feres, 340 u.s. at 146 •••. If, 
however, the alleged tortfeasor is not a member 
of the armed forces or a civilian employee 
engaged in activities usually associated with 
the armed forces, we conclude that a court 
should consult the Peres doctrine rationales as 
set forth in Stencel 'to determine to what 
extent, if any, allowance of [the] claim would 
circumvent the purposes of the [FTCA] as ••• 
construed by the [Supreme] Court.' Stencel, 431 
u.s. at 670." Ibid. 
The court then held that under its articulated 
7. 
analysis the Feres doctrine did not bar suit in this case. 
9-h 
~t found "absolutely no hint in the scant record 
" 
that the conduct of any alleged tortfeasor even 
remotely connected to the military will be scrutinized if 
this case proceeds to trial." Id., at 1539. It thus was 
"unable to discern any sound reason for barring 
[respondent's] suit under the Feres doctrine." Ibid. The 
court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
8. 
Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has 
reached the opposite conclusion." Ibid. (citing Uptegrove 
v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. denied, 444 
u.s. 1044 (1980)}. In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy 
lieutenant killed while flying horne on an Air Force C-141 
transport brought suit against the Government under the 
FTCA alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air 
traffic controllers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the 
suit on the basis of Feres.3 The Court of Appeals in this 
3The court in Uptegrove specifically addressed the argument 
that "the FAA employees were civilian employees and that the 
policy reasons for the Feres doctrine do not apply because there 
is no threatened interference with military discipline." 600 F. 
2d, at 1250. The court implicitly found that the suit did not 
threaten to interfere with military discipline, but that the 
absence of this factor did not render Feres inapplicable. 
Instead, it found that the proper focus was on the decedent's 
military status, not that of the tort feasor. The court 
concluded that because "there is no material issue of fact that 
[the decedent's] death arose out of activity incident to his 
military service [, the] Feres doctrine bars the ••• FTCA 
action." Id., at 1251. Uptegrove was decided before this 
Court's decision in United States v. Shearer, 105 s. Ct. 3039 
(1985) ~ ]Of course we do not approve the reasoning of Uptegrove 
~ ~- (Footnote continued) 
9. 
case found that "Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 
2d, at 1539, and expressly declined to reach the same 
result. 
The Government filed a suggestion for rehearing en 
bane, ~~~-the Court of Appeals granted. The en bane 
court reinstated the panel's opinion. It found this 
Court's decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 u.s. 
(1985) to be "most helpful" to its decision and to 
"reinforc[e] the analysis set forth in the panel opinion." 
779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986). The court noted that this 
Court in Shearer placed "[s]pecial emphasis ••• upon 
military discipline and whether or not the claim being 
(Footnote 3 
to the extent that it 
Shearer. Jr- ,., 
continued from previous page) 
is inconsistent with our decision in 
10. 
considered would require civilian courts to second-guess 
military decisions." Id., at 1493-1494. The court 
concluded: 
"[T]he panel op1n1on has given proper 
consideration to the Peres factors with 
particular attention to whether or not the 
claims asserted here will implicate civilian 
courts in conflicts involving the military 
structure or military decisions. The claims 
presented are based solely upon the conduct of 
civilian employees of the Federal Aviation 
Administration (a civilian administration within 
the Department of Transportation) who were not 
in any way involved in military activities. The 
fact that the decedent was a helicopter pilot 
for the United States Coast Guard is not 
sufficient, standing alone, to activate the 
Peres preclusion." I d., at 1494. 
Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, dissen~7<f ~ 
from the decision of the Court. The dissent found "the 
dictates of the Peres doctrine [to] exemp[t] the 
government from suit where an injury to a serviceman is 
'incident to service.'" Ibid. 
11. 
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to 
service, so under current law our decision ought to be a 
relatively straightforward affirmance." Ibid. The 
dissent criticized the "Peres factual paradigm" 
articulated by the court, noting that "cases in which a 
serviceman was injured incident to service by a civilian 
government employee are hardly novel" and that 
"consistently, no court until now has allowed recovery 
against the government in this sort of suit." I d., at 
1495.4 The dissent further observed that the facts of 
~ c.~ ~ - ill) r) 
4The list of citati~ compiled by the dissent~ is worth 
repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983), 
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 9 59 ( 1984) (Navy corpsman injured when 
struck by broken cable from hoist operated by civilians); warner 
v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CAS 1983) (off-duty Army 
enlisted man injured on base when motorcycle collided with 
shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee); Jaffee v. 
United States, 663 F. 2d 1226 (CA3 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 
456 U.s. 97 2 ( 1982) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure 
allegedly due in part to intentional tort of civilian Department 
of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission employees); Lewis v. 
United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 1981) (Marine Corps pilot 
(Footnote continued) 
12. 
this case should fall within the "Peres factual paradigm", 
if properly framed. According to the dissent: "[T]he 
true Peres factual paradigm is a case in which injury to a 
(Footnote 4 continued from previous page) 
killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government 
maintenance employees); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 
1981) (Air Force captain killed in crash at city airport for 
which city brought third-party claim against FAA controllers); 
Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA6 1979), cert. 
denied, 44S U.S. 904 (1980) (Air Force officer killed in crash of 
plane allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor 
employed by military flight club); Uptegrove v. United States, 
600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 1044 (1980) 
(serviceman killed in crash of Air Force transport due to alleged 
negligence of FAA air traffic controllers); watkins v. United 
States, 462 F. Supp. 980, aff'd on opinion below, S87 F. 2d 279 
(CAS 1979) (serviceman killed on base when motorcycle collided 
with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee); Hass 
v. United States, Sl8 F. 2d 1S9 (CAS 197S) (suit by insuroror 
serviceman injured through malpractice of Public Health Service 
employees barred); Bankston v. United States, 480 F. 2d 49S (CAS 
1973) (serviceman inJured through Public Health Service employee 
malpractice); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d SS8 (CA9 1968) 
(serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to 
FAA air controller negligence); She!pard v. United States, 369 
F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 86 U.S. 982 (1967) 
(serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to 
FAA air controller negligence) (companion case to Lee, supra); 
Layne v. United States, 29S F. 2d 433 (CA7 1961), cert. denied, 
368 u.s. 990 (1962) (National Guardsman killed on training flight 
due to negligence of civilian air controllers); United States v. 
Weiner, 33S F. 2d 379 (CA9 1964) cert. denied sub nom. United 
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 379 u.s. 9Sl (196~serviceman 
injured in part due to CAA employee negligence). 
13. 
serviceman is caused by any government employee" and 
"[t]his suit falls squarely within that paradigm." Id., 
at 1497 (emphasis in original). 
We granted certiorari, _u.s. ( 1986) , to review 
~ 
the Court of Appeals' ~formulation of the Feres doctrine 
and to resolve the conflict in the circuits on the issue.S 
We now reverse. 
II 
This Court's delineation of the boundaries of the 
Feres doctrine begins in a case decided before Feres 
itself. In Brooks v. United States, 337 u.s. 49 (1949), 
Sin addition to the decisi n of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Uptegrove specifically acknowledged by the Court 
of Appeals in this case, t e decision in this case conflicts in 
principle with the decisions of the Courts of Appeals cited 
supra, n. 4, and with a recent, unpublished decision of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Newell v. United States, No. 
86-1114 (Sept. 15, 1986). 
14. 
the Court confronted the question "whether members of the 
~ 
L'1Tzn-f-~ 
United States armed forces can recover under ~t Act for 
....<. 
injuries not incident to their service." I d., at 50. In 
Brooks, two brothers and their father were in an 
automobile accident on a public highway caused by the 
negligence of a civilian employee of the Army driving a 
~1....~~~~~ .. ~~~~­
t!U-
United States Army truck. One of the brothers was killed; ~ 
~ ~~ 
the other brother and the father were badly injured. The ~ 
~ 
"f.-
Court of Appeals denied recovery on behalf of the two ~ 
~ 
brothers on the grounds that as members of the armed 
forces, they could not recover against the Government. 
1-d*' ~11i~ This Court reverse 1 inding that the FTCA permitted 
~ 
recovery. The Court found the Government's fears of "dire 
consequences" unfounded where a suit is based upon "an 
accident which had nothing to do with the Brooks' army 
15. 
careers, [and] injuries not caused by their service, " 
noting that "[w]ere the accident incident to the Brooks' 
service, a wholly different case would be presented." 
Id., at 52. Although it rejected the Government's 
argument in ~ case, the Court indicated that "[t]he 
Government's fears may have point in reflecting 
congressional purpose to leave injuries incident to 
service where they were, despite literal language and 
other considerations to the contrary." Id., at 53. 
In Feres, the Court addressed the "'wholly different 
case' reserved ••• in Brooks." 340 u.s., at 138. The 
~~fconsidered three cases i~ the~eres eee~n. 1 . In 
the first case, the claim was that Army officials 
negligently quartered an serviceman in barracks known to 
be unsafe. The other two cases alleged negligence on the 
16. 
part of Army surgeons in treating servicemen. The 
question presented was "whether the Tort Claims act 
7? 
extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to service' ' 
what under other circumstances would be an actionable 
wrong." Ibid. 
~.~:;z.,r h Hc...t-~ 
noted "considerations persuasive 
"" 
of liability," ibid., but nevertheless concluded that "the 
Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out 
--------- - - --- 4 
{§i)are in the course of activity incident to service." 
Id., at 146. ~-~ 
~~pR Hu:..t-
In two places in the Peres opinion, the Court ~ ~ 
'JlA; .,_f t.:/" Lf-
~~··•tt.t.c..._l,L suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor ight~ 
be relevant to its decision. First, the Court identified 
"[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being 
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on 
{_~: ~~ 
h f- tJ ~ b ~ J-1.&._ 
~·~· 
furlough, sustained injury due to negligence of others in 
the armed forces." Id., at 138 (emphasis added). ~~--Second, t. 
~.
t'X-4L 
in discussing one of several grounds for the holding, the ~h 
Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of 
providing for those disabled in 
~ce to leave them dependent 
service by others in 
upon geographic 
considerations over which they have no control." id., at 
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the 
opinion, viewed as a whole, is broad: "We know of no 
~ 
American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover 
for negligence, against either his superior officers or 
the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis 
added); n I To whatever extent state law may apply to 
govern the relations between soldiers or others in the 
armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal 
18. 
governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents 
and consequences of the relation between persons in 
service and the Government are fundamentally derived from 
federal sources and governed by federal authority.'" Id., 
at 143-144 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 
u.s. 301 (1947)) (emphasis added). See id., at 142 
(finding relevant "the status of both the wronged and the 
wrongdoer") (emphasis added). It is this broad language 
that consistently has been repreated in recent decisions 
describing the Feres doctrine.6 Finally, the Court 
distinguished Brooks, supra, as follows: 
6see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 u.s. 296, 299 (1983) ("Congress 
did not intend to subject the Government to ••• claims [for 
injuries suffered by a soldier in service] by a member of the 
Armed Forces") (emphasis added); Stencel Aero En ineerin Cor • 
v. United States, 431 u.s. 666, 669 1977 (In Feres ••• the 
Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the 
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis 
added); Dalehite v. United States, 346 u.s. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) 
(Footnote continued) 
"The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in 
the course of military duty •••• This Court 
rejected the contention [that there should be no 
liability under the FTCA], primarily because 
Brooks' relationship while on leave was not 
analogous to that of a soldier injured while 




Decisions since Feres have refined the doctrine1 In 1\ 
I~ 
United States v. Brown, 348 u.s. 110 (1954) ,\the Court o-1-~ 
~ ~--- lt.u- ~lA~ 
characterized Feres as "holding that the Tort Claims Act ~MA/~ 
~~~ 
~&.­
does not cover 'injuries to servicemen where the injuries ~~~~ 
arise out of or are in the course of activity 
Y .... ~; 
service.' 340 u.s., at 146." Id., at 112. ~he court 
1 
observed that "[t]he peculiar and special relationship 
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the 
~I ~ ,r.~ 4.\. z... t).JI (~ t.-1--~ ~w--t- ,~., -t Jv ~ "" 
(Footnote 6 continued from previous page) 
(characterizing the Feres cases as involving "injuries 
allegedly caused by the negligence of employees of the United 




maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme 
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims 
Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent 
acts committed in the course of military duty, led the 
court to read that Act as excluding claim) of that 
character." Ibid. The Court then held that Peres did not 
bar a suit for negligence by a discharged veteran for 
medical treatment received in a Veterans Administration 
hospital, finding that the injury complained of "was not 
incident to military service." Ibid. 
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 
supra, the Court held that Peres bars a third-party 
indemnity action against the United States based on art 
injury incurred by a serviceman during the course of 
military duty. The Court identified three rationales 
21. 
underlying the Feres decision. First, "the relationship 
between the Government and members of its Armed Forces is 
'"distinctively federal in character,'" [and] it would 
make little sense to have the Government's liability to 
members of the Armed Services dependent on the fortuity of 
where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time of 
the injury." 431 u.s., at 671. Second, "the Veterans' 
Benefits Act established, as a substitute for tort 
liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme 
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, 
without regard to any negligence attributable to the 
.,.-- Government." Ibid. In fact, "the military compensation 
scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the 
Government as to service-connected injuries." Ibid. The 
third factor is the "effects of the maintenance of such 
22. 
suits on discipline," articulated in United States v. 
Brown, supra, at 112. The Court found the three factors 
equally applicable to a third-party indemnity suit brought 
by a government contractor against the Government. 
The Court's most recent statement respecting the Feres 
doctrine is in United States v. Shearer, supra. In that 
case, the Court confirmed that "Feres seems best 
explained" by the military discipline rationale. 105 s. 
Ct., at 3043 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 u.s. 
150, 162 (1963} (quoting United States v. Brown, supra, at 
112}}. The Court found that a suit brought by the mother 
of a serviceman who was killed by another serviceman while 
the victim was off duty and off the military base. The 
mother alleged that the killer's superiors failed to 
exercise sufficient control over him and negligently 
23. 
failed to warn others of the danger that he posed. The 
Court noted that "[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced 
to a few bright-line rules," ibid., and found that the 
allegations of the complaint went "directly to the 
'management' of the military ••• [,] call[ing] into 
question basic choices about the discipline, supervision, 
and control of a serviceman." Ibid. Although stating 
that the other grounds for the Feres decision are "no 
longer controlling," the Court noted that they were 
present: "It would be anomalous for the government's duty 
to supervise servicemen to depend on the local law of 
various states ••• and the record shows that Private 
Shearer's dependents are entitled to statutory veterans' 
benefits." Id., at 3043, n. 4. Accordingly, the Court 




Feres precludes suit under the FTCA for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service." 340 u.s., at 146. This Court has never 
deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar. 
Neither has Congress changed this standard in the more 
than 35 years since it was articulated, although, as the 
Court noted in Fe res, Congress "possesses a ready remedy" 
to alter a misinterpretation of its intent. Id., at 138. 
Here, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed while 
performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary 
duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 u.s.c. §§1, 2, 88(a) (1) .7 
7The Coast 
services . a-t 
f; ' oi ~ > ....... ~ 1-.ir:-.f 
GUard 1s a military serviceJ an~ branch of the armed 
aH:--~-imes. 14 u.s.c. §1. 
~ 
25. 
There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly 
~~- u 
out of the rescue mission, ~h is clearly an activity 
" "\ ,, 
incident to {!J. i sjmilitary servic:_. According to the 
standard as it has consistently been articulated, the 
s 
Peres doctrine s~ould bar suit in this case. 
~~ 
Respondent argues that although the Court continues to 
A 
~')A-C.~ 
use the Peres terminology, ~r decisions indicate that the 
standard is no longer what ~n its fac3 it appears to b~ 
Respondent relies on ~~~ ~~ation in 
It /2--.~ 
United States v. Shearer, supr~,jlthat the effect of tort 
suits on military discipline is the "best expla [nation]" 
for the Peres doctrine. 105 s. Ct., at 3043. According 
to respondent, because this suit does not question the 
actions of a fellow member of the military, it will not 
26. 
impair military discipline and thus the Feres bar should 
not apply. 
B 
The contention that Feres bars only suits ~hJ? 
/'dire~~~ military personnel fails to recognize the 
0 t ~, t/ 
scope of the impact on military discipline that Feres is 
designed to prevent. A distinction that relies on the 
identity of the named defendant is too facile in this 
context. Any challenge based upon a service-related 
injury necessarily threatens to call into question the 
l try 
conduct of the military as well as the named defendant. , 
Questions as to the "hows" and "whys" of the military 
mission are almost always intertwined with the 
determination of liability on the part of the named 
defendant. Even if not named as defendants, members of 
27. 
the military must stand ready to defend their actions as 
part of pretrial investigation and discovery into the 
cause of the injury and the potential for contributory 
negligence. The "general costs" of "distraction of 
officials from their governmental duties [and] inhibition 
of discretionary action" occur when military personnel 
must face the "risks of trial," as well as trial itself. 
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 800, 816 (1982) 
(emphasis added). Consequently, respondent's ~igerett1r 
assertions that her suit will not question command 
decisions, even if accurate on the specific facts of this 
case, are unavailing; this is clearly the "~ of suit 
[in which] commanding officers would have to stand 
prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a 
28. 
wide range of military and disciplinary decisions." 
United States v. Shearer, supra, at 3044 (emphasis added). 
Even assuming that no military judgments would be 
challenged in this suit, the argument that questioning 
civilian conduct does not implicate military discipline 
concerns is in error. Civilian employees of the federal 
government often work closely with the military to 
facilitate the performance of military activities.8 As 
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted in a 
Feres doctrine case, "a civilian is analogous to a 
serviceman when he is performing functions for the benefit 
8rn fact, FAA flight controllers are an excellent example of 
civilian personnel who work in concert with the military to J, 
facilitate military functions. In general, the FAA and the ~J' ~, 
United States Armed Forces have a formal working relationship 
that provides for FAA participation in military activities. See 
FAA, u.s. Dept. of Transp., Order 7610.4F: Special Military 
Operations (Jan. 21, 1981). Specifically in this case, the FAA 
played an integral role in the military mission. 
29. 
of the military." Hass ex. rel. United States v. United 
States, 518 F. 2d 1138, 1142, n. 4 (1975). The effective 
performance of military functions demands that civilians 
respond with the same unhesitating conduct required of 
military personnel, and the threat of tort liability for 
these civilians would have the same impact on the 
discipline and effectiveness of military operations as if 
military judgment were questioned directly. Accordingly, 
application of the Feres doctrine is appropriate. 
Most importantly, a focus on "military discipline" as 
being threatened only when command or strategic judgments 
of military officers are implicated is too narrow. This 
Court's recent statement that the scope of the Feres 
doctrine includes a challenge to "a decision of command" 
did not imply that this is the limit of the doctrine's 
30. 
application. United States v. Shearer, supra, at 3044. 
Read in context, this passage in Shearer indicates that 
Peres bars all "types of claims that, if generally 
permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive 
military affairs at the expense of military discipline and 
effectiveness." Ibid. (emphasis omitted). These types of 
claims necessarily range from a challenge to a judgment 
respecting the control and discipline of an individual 
serviceman to a challenge to "the wisdom of broad military 
policy." Ibid. In fact, the decision in Peres itself 
indicates that the doctrine is not limited in application 
to suits that will necessarily question command decisions 
of superior officers. Whereas one of the cases under 
review involved the judgment by military officials to 
house servicemen in certain barracks, the other two 
31. 
involved claims of medical malpractice against Army 
surgeons. Ostensibly, the malpractice suits would not 
have implicated military discipline in the strict sense of 
"a heirarchical structure of discipline and obedience to 
command." Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 300. 
Nevertheless, this Court found that the suits were barred 
because the servicemen sought to recover damages from the 
Government for injuries incurred in the course of their 
military duties. 
Feres and its progeny indicate that inquiry into 
injuries "incident to service" necessarily implicates the 
fundamental military discipline rationale of the doctrine, 
32. 
when the concept is properly framed.9 This concept is not 
limited to "instinctive obedience" to specific orders. 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 s. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986). 
Instead, "military discipline" also embodies "unity, 
commitment, and esprit de corps." Ibid. In every respect 
the military is, as this Court has often recognized, "a 
specialized society separate from civilian society." 
Parker v. Levy, 417 u.s. 733 (1974). See Orloff v. 
9Respondent relies on this Court's recent decision in United 
States v. Shearer, supra, to argue that we have eschewed "bright-
line rules" such as the one that we affirm today: that all claims 
by servicemen against the Government for injuries incurred 
"incident to service" are barred. 105 s. Ct., at 3043. But 
respondent reads this remark in Shearer out of context. That 
case is properly read to hold that the question whether a 
particular injury is "incident to service" is not dispositive 
where strong military discipline concerns indicate that suit 
nevertheless should not proceed. Although the "incident to 
service" test can be expected to encompass most suits that 
present a threat to military discipline, Shearer indicates that 
even where the injury is not service-related, suit may be barred 
if it would "requir[e] the civilian court to second-guess 
military decisions" or "impair essential military discipline." 
Ibid. 
33. 
Willoughby, 345 u.s. 83, 94 {1953). Thus, even where 
protections are constitutional, "[t]he rights of military 
men must yield somewhat '"to meet certain overriding 
demands of discipline and duty."'" Brown v. Glines, 444 
u.s. 348, 354 {1980) {quoting Parker v. Levy, supra, at 
758) {quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 u.s. 137, 140 {1953) 
{ plurality opinion)) ) • 
Tort suits brought on behalf of servicemen against the 
Government threaten military discipline in that they 
undermine the fundamental commitment of serviceman to 
Sovereign. Serviceman status brings with it the prestige 
of membership as well as the numerous benefits unique to 
military service.lO At the same time, it is no secret 
lOThe library is compiling a list of the special benefits for 
this note. 
3 4. 
that military service entails "[s] ignificant risks of 
accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States, supra, at 672. In fact, a large measure 
of the prestige inherent in military service stems from 
the willingness of servicemen to undertake these risks in 
order to serve their country. Permitting suits by 
servicemen against the country they serve for service- ( 
related injuries ould undermine the commitment essential 
to effective service. Military discipline involves not 
only loyalty to one's direct superiors, but loyalty to th 
Nation as a whole as the conduct of its officials impacts 







military discipline rationale that forms the basis for the 
0 
Feres doctrine properly applies to all suits against the 
35. 
Government on behalf of servicemen based on injuries 
incurred incident to service. 
c 
In addition to the impact of suits brought for 
injuries incurred "incident to service" on military 
discipline, the other factors that contributed to the 
decision in Peres support the decision in this case.ll 
First, Johnson and the FAA flight controllers, both being 
lo ~ ., k-~1- n 
llRespondent puts great ,weight on our recent observation that 
these additional factors are "no longer \controlling." United 
States v. Shearer, supra, at 3043, n. 4. But these factors--
the availability of stptutory veterans~benefits and the anomaly 
of applying local lawjbetween a service an and the Government he 
is serving -- could not be controlling 9therwise almost any suit 
brought by a serviceman against the Gove[ nment would be barred 
regardless of whether it occurred incident to service or whether 
military discipline concerns were implicated. Instead, these 
factors have special weight in the context in which they were 
articulated. First, where an injury is "incident to service," it 
is the particular type of injury that the statutory benefits were 
created to compensate. It is also the type of injury that 
servicemen could anticipate as part of their military service. 
Thus, it makes sense that servicemen would be limited to the 
statutory recovery for service-related injuries. Second, when a 
serviceman is injured "incident to service," his injury is 
directly tied to his "distinctively federal relationship" with 
{Footnote continued) 
36. 
employees of the Federal Government performing 
specifically federal duties, were in a relationship 
"distinctively federal in character." 340 u.s., at 143. 
It would make little sense for the Government's liability 
to one of its employees on behalf of another to depend on 
the vagaries of state law. Also, respondent received full 
veterans' benefits for her husband's death. These 
benefits are generous, and, as we have previously 
observed, properly "provid[e] an upper limit of liability 
for the Government as to service-connected injuries." 
Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp., supra, at 673. See 
Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 u.s. 460, 464 
(Footnote 11 continued from previous page) 
the Government he is serving. Thus, applying local law to this 
relationship would be particularly anomalous. 
37. 
{1980) {"[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided 
compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood 
Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-
connected injuries"). 
IV 
We reaffirm the holding of Peres that "the Government 
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 
u.s., at 146. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
lfp/ss 03/14/87 
JOHNS22 SALLY-POW 
Rider A, p. 22 (Johnson) 
The most recent decision of this Court involving 
the Peres doctrine is United States v. Shearer, supra. 
The case involved a suit by the mother of a serviceman who 
was killed by another serviceman while the victim was off 
duty and off the military base. The mother alleged that 
the killer's superiors failed to exercise sufficient 
control over him, and negligently failed to warn others of 
the danger that he imposed. Although the Court stated 
that "Peres seems best explained by the military 
discipline rationale, 105 s.ct., at 3043 (quoting United 
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (quoting United 
States v. Brown, supra, at 112)), the Court stated that 
"[t]he Peres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-
2. 
line rules". Id. On the basis of the allegations of the 
complaint, the Court stated that these went "directly to 
the 'management' of the military ••• [,] call[ing] into 
question basic choices about discipline, supervision and 
control of a serviceman." Although stating that the other 
grounds for the Feres decision are "no longer 
controlling", the opinion of Chief Justice Burger noted 
that they were present, and were relied upon: "It would 
anomalous for the government's duty to supervise 
servicemen to depend on the local law of various states • 
and the record shows that Private Shearer's dependents 
are entitled to statutory veterans' benefits." 
~o. 8S-2o3Pi u.s. v. jolwt-s;VA-
) 
III 






Feres precludes suit under the FTCA for injuries that 
~~~LJ... 
uarise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
~~ 
service.~ 340 u.s., at 146. This Court has never 
deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar. 
Neither has Congress changed this standard in the more 
than 35 years since it was articulated, although, as the 
Court noted in Fe res, Congress 'jpossesses a ready remedy 11 
to alter a misinterpretation of its intent. Id., at 138.5 
Respondent finds significance in the fact that the 
tortfeasors in Feres were members of the military. But 
Scongress has recently considered, but not enacted, 
legislation that would allow service members to bring medical 
malpractice suits against the Government. See H.R. 1161, 99th 
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983) • 
24. 
doctrine apply with equal force to a case, such as this 
one, where negligence on the part of a civilian government 
employee is alleged.? The Feres doctrine has consistently 
been understood to bar suit on behalf of service members 
against the Government based upon service-related 
injuries. we decline to modify the doctrine at this late 
date. 
(Footnote 6 continued from previous page) 
allegedly caused by the negligence of employees of the United 
States) (emphasis added). ~ 
?Respondent puts great weight on our recent observation that 
factors other than the effect f a suit on military discipline 
are "no longer controlling.~ nited States v. Shearer, supra, at 
3043, n. 4. But these factors -- the availability of statutory 
veterans' benefits and the anomaly of applying local law between 
a serviceman and the Government he is serving -- could not be 
controlling, otherwise almost any suit brought by a serviceman 
against the Government would be barred regardless of whether the 
underlying injury occurred incident to service or whether the 
suit implicated military discipline concerns. Instead, these 
factors have special weight in the context in which they were 
articulated -- where a serviceman seeks to sue the Government for 




~The relationship between the Government and members 
of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal in 
character.'~ Feres, supra, at 143 (quoting United States 
v. Standard Oil, supra, at 301). This federal 
relationship is implicated to the greatest degree when the 
service member is performing activities incident to his 
federal service. Performance of the military function 
entails ~'[s]ignificant risks of accidents and injuries,u 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 
672, in diverse parts of the country and the world. Where 
a service member is injured incident to service -- that 
is, because of his military relationship with the 
Government -- it ~makes no sense to permit the fortuity of 
the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the 
liability of the Government to [the] serviceman.u Ibid. 
26. 
Instead, application of the underlying federal remedy that 
provides Hsimple, certain, and uniform compensation for 
injuries or death of those in armed services,~ Feres, 
supra, at 144, is appropriate. 
The existence of these generous statutory disability 
and death benefits is an independent reason why the Feres 
doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries.8 In 
Feres, the Court observed that the Hprimary purpose" of 
the FTCA 11 was to extend a remedy to those who had been 
without; if it incidentally benefited those already well 
provided for, it appears to have been unintentional. 11 320 
Bservice members receive numerous other benefits unique to 
their service status. For example, members of the military and 
their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive 
health benefits, home-buying loan benefits, space available 
travel on overseas flights, and retirement benefits after a 
minimum of 20 years of service. See generally Uniformed Services 
Almanac ( 1985) • 
/'' 
27. 
u.s., at 140. Those injured during the course of activity 
incident to service not only receive benefits that 
"compare favorably with those provided by most workmen's 
compensation statutes, .. id., at 145, but their recovery is 
11 swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no 
litigation ... Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres 
found it difficult to believe that Congress would have 
provided such a comprehensive system of benefits while at 
the same time contemplating recovery for service-related 
injuries under the FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the 
fact that Congress 'jomi tted any provision to adjust these 
two types of remedy to each other." 340 u.s., at 144. 
Congress still has not amended the veteran's benefits 
statute or the FTCA to make any such provision for 
28. 
injuries incurred during the course of activity incident 
to service, even though it has made such a provision for 
veterans who receive FTCA awards after they have been 
discharged from service. See 38 u.s.c. §351. See also 
Brooks v. United States, supra. We thus find no reason to 
modify what we have previously found to be the law: the 
statutory military benefits ~provid[e] an upper limit of 
liability for the Government as to service-connected 
injuries." Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp. v. United 
States, supra, at 673. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United 
States, 444 u.s. 460, 464 (1980) ("[T]he Veterans' 
Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, 
which we understood Congress intended to be the sole 
remedy for service-connected injuries"). 
29. 
Suits brought by service members against the 
aks:; 
Government for injuries incurred incident to service 1are 
~ barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the 
11 types of claims that, if generally permitted, would 
involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the 
expense of military discipline and effectiveness ... United 
States v. Shearer, supra, at 3043. In every respect the 
military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized 
society separate from civilian society.~~ Parker v. Levy, 
417 u.s. 733L 743 (1974); See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 
u.s. 83, 94 (1953). "[T]o accomplish its mission the 
military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, 
commitment, and esprit de corps.~· Goldman v. Weinberger, 
106 s. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986). Military discipline 
involves not only obedience to orders, but in a broader 
30. 
sense involves duty and loyalty to one's service and to 
one's country. Suits brought by service members against 
the Government for service-related injuries have the 
potential to disrupt this essential military discipline in 
rL- br-o--~1--
~ sense of the word. Aeeotdingl:y, the Feres cloct~ 
B 
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed 
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a 
primary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 u.s.c. §§1, 2, 
88(a) (1) .9 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury 
arose directly out of the rescue mission, that is clearly 
an activity incident to his military service. Johnson 
9The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an 
important branch of the armed services. 14 u.s.c. §1. 
31. 
went on the rescue mission specifically because of his 
military status. His wife received and is continuing to 
receive statutory benefits on account of his death. And 
the potential that a suit in this case would disrupt 
military discipline is substantial; Johnson was acting 
. - . LiJl , ~.A.-Pl.- P-p-~ ,. .... e_ J.... .,. 1 }14 ..-< t. .A~~ o« '<-' tr'f ~ c.o--..,..j-
~ under~d~, and the civilian officials named in ~~ 




. this case thus fall 




has been articulated. 
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lOThe FAA and the United States Armed Forces have a formal ~· 
working relationship that provides for FAA participation in ·-~ ~ 
military activities. See FAA, u.s. Dept. of Transp., Order ~~~ ~~-~ 
7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981). ~-- ' 
Specifically in this case, the FAA played an integral role in ~he ~ .• ~ 
military mission. -----=------ 1-o? 
r~J 1r~-
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we reaffirm the holding of Feres that uthe Government 
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to service. 11 340 
U.S., at 146. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
23. 
longer controlling", the opinion of Chief Justice Burger 
noted that they were present, and were relied upon: "It 
would anomalous for the government's duty to supervise 
servicemen to depend on the local law of various states 
•• and the record shows that Private Shearer's dependents 
are entitled to statutory veterans' benefits." Id., at 
3043, n. 4. For all of these reasons, the Court found 
that Feres barred the suit. 
III 
A 
Feres precludes suit under the FTCA for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service." 340 u.s., at 146. This Court has never 
deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar. 
Neither has Congress changed this standard in the more 
24. 
as the 
Court noted in Peres, Congress "possesses a ready remedy" 
to alter a misinterpretation of its intent. Id., at 138.6 
Here, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed while 
I 
{ performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary ~ 
I \ 
duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 u.s.c. §§1, 2, 88(a) (1) .7 
There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly 
out of the rescue mission, that is clearly an activity 
incident to his military service. According to the 
standard as it has consistently been articulated, the 
Peres doctrine bars suit in this case. 
)-
) 
6congress has recently considered, but not enacted, 
legislation that would allow service members to bring medical 
malpractice suits against the Government. See H.R. 1161, 99th 
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); H.R. 1942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983). 
7The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an 






Respon ent nevertheless argues that although the Court 
continues use the Feres terminology, more recent 
standard is no longer what it 
appears to be o its face. Respondent relies on selected 
Feres, especially nited States v. Shearer, supra, stating 
the "best expla[natio " for the Feres doctrine.8 
Respondent argues that effect of a particular suit on 
military discipline is the only relevant consideration 
under Feres. Respondent t en contends that the Feres 
doctrine should not bar her suit because her suit alleges 
8 S~e United States v. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3043 
(1985); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 u.s. 2 6, 300 (1983); United 
States v. Muniz, 374 u.s. 150, 159 (1963); United States v. 
Brown, 348 u.s. 110, 112 ( 1954). 
26. 
negligence on t e part of a civilian employee of the 
nt, as opposed to a member of the 
military, and therefore cannot implicate this concern of 
Feres. We disaJ ee with respondent's proposed 
modification of the Feres doctrine and with her 
application of the doctrine to this case. 
I 
\ B I 
I 
The holding of the Court in Fe res was that "the 
Government is not iiable under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
for injuries to icemen where the injuries arise out of 
I 
or are in the course of activity incident to service." 
340 u.s., at 146. Although the alleged tortfeasors in ~ 
~ ~~-.1..,~ ~A 
Fe res were members o~ the military, ~w.e .do ~gt find -'\that 
q___ /'4A- ,{,-~ ~ dc-
£7 .. L_, fact to have been\ matilrral t~ tit-e decision. Nor do we 
find that this Court's later descriptions of the doctrine 
27. 
in any way have 1 'mited its applicability to a suit based 
~ 
upon a service-r ated injury. Instead, we ~that for 
all of the reaso/ s that underlie the Peres doctrine,9 when 
a service membe .r sues the Government for an injury that 
I 
~ 
9Respondent puts great weight on ~ recent observation that 
factors other than the effect of a suit on military discipline 
are "no longer controlling." United States v. Shearer, supra, at 
3043, n. 4. But these factors -- the availabil1ty of statutory 
veterans' benefits and the anomaly of applying local law between 
a serviceman and the Government he is serving -- could not be 
controlling, otherwise almost any suit brought by a serviceman 
against the Government would be barred regardless of whether the 
underlying injury occurred incident to service or whether the 
suit implicated military discipline concerns. Instead, these 
factors have special weight in the context in which they were 
articulated -- where a serviceman seeks to sue the Government for 
an injury incurred in the course of an activity incident to 
service. 
espondent also argues that the decision in Shearer eschewed 
"brigfi ine rules" such as the one that we affirm today: that 
all claims servicemen against the Government for injuries 
incurred "incr nt to service" are barred. 105 s. Ct., at 3043. 
But respondent re G~ this remark in Shearer out of context. That 
case is properly reaa 0 hold that the question whether a 
particular injury is "incident to service" is not dispositive 
where strong military discipline concerns indicate that suit 
nevertheless should not proceed. Although the "incident to 
service" test can be expected to encompass most suits that 
present a threat to military discipline, Shearer indicates that 
even where the injury is not service-related, suit may be barred 
if it would "requir[e] the civilian court to second-guess 




arises out o activity incident to service, ~the doctrine 
continues o bar suit. 
"The relationship between the Government and members 
of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal in 
character.'" Peres, supra, at 143 (quoting United States 
v. Standard Oil, supra, at 301). This federal 
relationship is implicated to the greatest degree when the 
service member is performing activities incident to his 
federal service. It is ~~ ~military service 
'\ 
entails "[s]ignificant risks of accidents and injuries." 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 
~ i.- .?--~ u-_r-~ ~ ~ .k.. 
672. 1\An--~j ~~oun~ . e o£ -MHta£::t SCPJice io tfie -4t.,~ 
~~-~ ~., ~~~~~~~f!!o---
pe t w o dec1 es 
to enter the Armed Forces and that a service 





comprehensive system of military disability benefits 
~ 
I 
~ 14. J • /i#~op i> , 
e st-ahl: :Hrl'red--ey--€0flg li' e e"S"""w-i th -+-t-~l'T1.,..ert!~ e 1\. s e rv ice- r el at ed 
service-re be particularly anomalous to 
disregard he essentially federal nature of the underlying 
'to have the Government's 1 iabil ity to members 
dependent on the fortuity of where the 
stationed at the time of the 
!E·, at 671 . ~·----------------
The existence of )\ ...Qempr el'l-efis :k::s syStem 
$ 
~y benefits r provid~ "simple, certain, and 
uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in 
~ 
armed services : ~ s an independent reason why the Peres 
f,v U' .. l r ( ;v t • r _, 
doctrine bars suit in this- ease. Peres, supra, at 144. 
4 In Peres, the Court observed that the "primary purpose" of 
30. 
the FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been 
without; if it incidentally benefited those already well 
provided for, it appears to have been unintentional." 320 
u.s., at 140. Those injured during the course of activity 
incident to service not only receive benefits that 
"compare favorably with those provided by most workmen's 
compensation statutes," id., at 145, but their recovery is 
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no 
litigation." Feres, supra, at 145 , lP The Court in Feres 
found it difficult to believe that Congress would have 
provided such a comprehensive system of benefits while at 
lOservice members receive numerous other benefits unique to 
their service status. For example, members of the military and 
their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive 
health benefits, home-buying loan benefits, space available 
travel on overseas flights, and retirement benefits after a 
minimum of 20 years of service. See generally Uniformed Services 
Almanac ( 1985) • 
31. 
the same time contemplating recovery for service-related 
injuries under the FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the 
fact that Congress "omit ted any provision to adjust these 
two types of remedy to each other. " 340 u.s., at 144. 
Congress still has not amended the veteran's benefits 
statute or the FTCA to make any such provision for 
injuries incurred during the course of activity incident 
to service, even though it has made such a provision for 
veterans who receive FTCA awards after they have been 
discharged from service. See 38 u.s.c. §351. See also 
Brooks v. United States, supra. We thus find no reason to 
modify what we have previously found to be the law: the 
statutory military benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of 
liability for the Government as to service-connected 
injuries." Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp. v. United 
32. 
States, supra, at 673. See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United 
States, 444 u.s. 460, 464 (1980) ("[T]he Veterans' 
Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, 
which we understood Congress intended to be the sole 
remedy for service-connected injuries"). 
The "best expla[nation]", United States v. Shearer, 
supra, at 3043, for the Feres doctrine-- the effect of a 
tort suit on military discipline is also fully 
applicable to any suit brought on behalf of a service 
member against the Government for an injury incurred in 
the course of an activity incident to military service. 
The fact that a suit alleges negligence on the part of a 
civilian employee of the federal government does not make 
the military discipline rationale inapplicable. Any 
challenge based upon a service-related injury necessarily 
33. 
threatens to call into question the conduct of the 
military as well as that of the alleged tortfeasor. 
Questions as to the "hows" and "whys" of the military 
mission are almost always intertwined with the 
determination of liability on the part of the alleged 
~ tortfeasor. Even if not named as defendants, members of 
the military must stand ready to defend their actions as 
part of pretrial investigation and discovery into the 
cause of the injury and the potential for contributory 
negligence.ll Moreover, a challenge to civilian conduct 
alone often can impact adversely on military discipline. 
Civilian employees of the federal government frequently 
om their 
ction" 
"risks of t 'al " 
'-~~~e~r~a~l~d, 457 u.s. 800, 
34. 
work closely with the military to facilitate the 
performance of military activities.l2 As the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted in a Feres 
doctrine case, "a civilian is analogous to a serviceman 
when he is performing functions for the benefit of the 
military." Hass ex. rel. United States v. United States, 
518 F. 2d 1138, 1142, n. 4 {1975). The effective 
erformance of military functions demands that civilians 
respond with the same unhesitating conduct required of 
military personnel, and the threat of tort liability for 
these civilians would have the same impact on the 
~~ct, FAA flight controlle re a 
c· ilian personnel who work in concert wir~~~~~~~~~--
cil 'tate military functions. In enera . 1the FAA and the ~ 
United Sta es Arme Forces have a formal working relationship ~-
that provides for FAA participation in military activities. See 
FAA, u.s. Dept. of Transp., Order 7610.4F: Special Military 
Operations {Jan. 21, 1981). Specifically in this case, the FAA 
played an integral role in the military mission. 
\ 
35. 
discipline and effectiveness of military operations as if 
military judgment were questioned directly. 
discipline" is broad, encompassing the need not only for 
"instinctive obedience" to specific orders, Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 106 s. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986), but also for 
"unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Ibid. 
serve for 
commitment 
service members against the 
~ lM,i ~ tt:...tJI.AJ- • ~ 
p:..~~J 
t..l-~ ~c"t..( 
~~it :&::; ~z;;! k 
~c£ ~a.Lht ~ 
1-t:> ~ ~" 
) 
i 
- .. ) 
service.l3 Feres bars all~pes of claims that, if 
__.. 
permitted, would involve the judiciary in 
sensitive military affairs at the expense of military 
36. 
discipline and effectiveness." United States v. Shea 
~----'-'~.;;...~"17'\ 
Thus, the military discipline ratio 
that forms the basis for the Feres doctrine properly 
applies to all suits against the Government on behalf of 
service members based on injuries arising out of act' ity 
incident to service. 
IV 
l3Jn fact, the decision in Feres itself indicates that the 
doctrine is not limited in appl1cation to suits that will 
necessarily question command decisions of superior officers. 
? 
Whereas one of the cases under review involved the judgment by ~ 
military officials to house servicemen in certain barracks, the  
other two involved claims of medical malpractice against Army 
1 
_ , 
surgeons. Ostensibly, the malpractice suits would not have ~
implicated military discipline in the strict sense of "a ~ 
heirarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command."  
Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 300. Nevertheless, this Court 
found that the suits were barred because the servicemen sought to h ~ 
recover damages from the Government for injuries incurred in the _ ~ e 
course of their military duties. . 1 _ 
t~~ 
37. 
We reaffirm the holding of Peres that "the Government 
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for 
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or 
are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 
U.s. , at 146. ccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the 
Court of or the Eleventh Circuit and remand for 
proceedings consi tent with this opinion. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents the question whether the doctrine es-
tablished in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars 
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a 
service member killed during the course of an activity inci-
dent to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on 
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government. 
I 
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed 
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, John-
son's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat 
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast 
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel. 
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson 
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Govern-
ment. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control 
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter 
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai. 
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the 
crash. 
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received vet- · 
erans' benefits as a result of her husband's death.' In addi-
tion, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint 
sought damages from the United States on the ground that 
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death. 
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that be-
cause Johnson was killed during the course of his military du-
ties, respondent could not r~cover damages from the United 
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the com-
plaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 
749 F . 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that 
precludes suits by service members against the Government 
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found , 
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres 
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding ac-
cording to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court 
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual para-
digm" that is present when a service member alleges negli-
gence on the part of another member of the military. 7 49 F . 
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present, 
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the 
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when 
negligence is alleged on the part of a federal government em-
ployee who is not a member of the military, the court found 
that the propriety of a suit should be determined by examin-
'Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death 
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and 
compensatory benefits. Brief for the United States 3, n. 1. The depen-
dency and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the 
surviving spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child 
of the veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 411 (1982 ed., Supp. III); 
38 CFR §§ 3.500, 3.502. 
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ing the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. Al-
though it noted that this Court has articulated numerous ra-
tionales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on 
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification. 
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court 
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged 
tortfeasor even remotely connected with the military will be 
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." I d., at 1539. Ac-
cordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's suit. 
The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has 
reached the opposite conclusion." Ibid. (citing Uptegrove 
v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. denied, 444 
U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that "Uptegrove 
was wrongly decided," ibid., and declined to reach the same 
result. 
The Court of Appe;:t.ls granted the Government's sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 
2 We have identified three factors that underlie the Feres doctrine: 
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its 
Armed Forces is "'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little 
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services 
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at 
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as 
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme 
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to 
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor . . . [is] 
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme re-
sults that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military 
duty . ... "' Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted). 
3 In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on 
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under 
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic control-
lers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres. 
85-2039---0PINION 
4 UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON 
52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis-set forth in the panel opin-
ion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly 
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and 
whether or not the claim being considered would require ci-
vilian courts to second -guess military decisions," id., at 
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evalu-
ated the claim under Feres and therefore reinstated the panel 
op1mon. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, 
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual 
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because 
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to 
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a rel-
atively straightforward affirmance." I d., at 1494. 
We granted certiorari, -- U. S. -- (1986), to review 
the Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and 
to resolve the conflict among the circuits on the issue. 4 We 
now reverse. 
II 
In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot 
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated 
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Con-
gress changed this standard in the more than 35 years since it 
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, 
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre-
'In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this 
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals cited infra, n. 8. 
5 See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States 
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138.6 Although ali of the cases 
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations 
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this 
Court has never suggested that the military status of the al-
leged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7 
6 Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that 
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the 
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
7 In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the mili-
tary status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision.· First, the 
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being 
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained 
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." !d., at 138 (em-
phasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the hold-
ing, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing for 
those disabled in service by others in servi~e to leave them dependent upon 
geographic considerations over which they have no control." Id., at 143 
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed as a 
whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a 
soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the 
Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); 
"' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations 
between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or 
nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and 
consequences of the relation between persons in se:r;-vice and the Govern-
ment are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by fed-
eral authority."' Id., at 143-144 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil 
Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the wronged and the 
wrongdoer") (emphasis added). 
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the 
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on 
that fact. See id., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the Feres 
case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the 
course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that consist-
ently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres doctrine. 
See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not intend to sub-
ject the Government to ... claims [for injuries suffered by a soldier in 
service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added); Stencel 
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres ... the 
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant 
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied 
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members 
Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the negligence 
of Government officials may not recover against the United States under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v. United 
States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases as in-
volving "injuries . .. allegedly caused by negligence of employees of the 
United States) (emphasis added). 
8 The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492, 
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar 
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the 
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 
F . 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken 
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984); 
Warner v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted 
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by 
civilian government employee); Jaffree v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226 
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part 
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. de-
nied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of gov-
ernment maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Car-
ter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in 
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA 
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979) 
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civil-
ian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445 
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979) 
(see supra, n. 3), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United 
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when 
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government em-
ployee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d 
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of military-
owned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (ser-
viceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic 
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v. 
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982 
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guards-
man killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traf-
fic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United States v. Wiener, 
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries. 
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 
A 
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underly-
ing the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States , 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and supra, 
n. 2. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine dem-
onstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does not 
have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of 
Appeals in this case. 9 First, "[t]he relationship between the 
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively 
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree 
when a service member is performing activities incident to 
his federal service. Performance of the military function in 
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignifi-
cant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service 
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his 
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no 
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negli-
335 F . 2d 379 (CA9 1964) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged CAA 
employee negligence'), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Airlines, Inc . v. 
United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964). 
9 Respondent puts great weight on this Court's recent observation that 
factors other than the effect of a suit on military discipline are "no longer 
controlling." United States v. Shearer, supra, at 58, n. 4. But these fac-
tors alone-the availability of veterans' benefits and the anomaly of apply-
ing local law to the federal relationship between a serviceman and the Gov-
ernment he is serving-could not be controlling, otherwise almost any suit 
brought by a serviceman against the Government would be barred regard-
less of whether the underlying injury occurred incident to service or 
whether the suit implicated military discipline concerns. Instead, these 
factors have special weight in the context in which they were articulated-
where a serviceman seeks to sue the Government for an injury incurred in 
the course of an activity incident to service. 
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gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] ser-
viceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying fed-. 
eral remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform 
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed serv-
ices," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate. 
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disabil-
ity and death benefits is an independent reason why the 
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In 
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the 
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been with-
out; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided 
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at 
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to 
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely fa-
vorably with those provided by most workmen's compensa-
tion statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is 
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litiga-
tion," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it diffi-
cult to believe that Congress would have provided such a 
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time 
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the 
FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress 
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy 
to .each other." I d., at 144. Congress still has not amended 
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such 
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity 
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what 
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory 
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the 
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v. 
10 Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their 
service status. For example, members of the military and their depend-
ents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-
buying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years 
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (1985). 
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Aero 'Engineering Corp .. v. United States, supra, at 673. 
See Hatzlachh Supply Co . v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act pro-
vided compensation to injured servicemen, which we under-
stood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-
connected injuries"). 
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by 
service members against the Government for injuries in-
curred incident to service are barred by the F eres doctrine 
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally per-
mitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military af-
fairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in origi.~ 
nal). In every respect the military is, as this Court has rec-
ognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military 
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and 
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger,-- U. S.--, 
-- (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically 
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related ac-
tivity necessarily implicates the military judgments and deci-
sions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of 
the military mission. 11 Moreover, military discipline in-
volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty 
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits 
brought by service members against the Government for 
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment es-
sential to effective service and thus have the potential to dis-
rupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word. 
11 Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in 
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activi-
ties would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry 
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States 
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for 
FAA participation in numerous military activities . See FAA, U. S. Dept. 
of Transp. , Order 7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981). 
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B 
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed 
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a pri-
mary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2, 
88(a)(l). 12 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose di-
rectly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an 
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on 
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status. 
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory bene-
fits on . account of his death. Because Johnson was acting 
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast 
Guard, the potential that a suit in this case could implicate 
military discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this 
case thus fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it con-
sistently has been articulated. 
III 
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is 
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at .146. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
12 The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important 
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1. 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents the question whether the doctrine es-
tablished in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950) , bars 
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a 
service member killed during the course of an activity inci-
dent to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on 
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government. 
I 
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed 
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, John-
son's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat 
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast 
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel. 
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson 
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Govern-
ment. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control 
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter 
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of :Jolokai. 
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the 
crash. 
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received vet-
erans' benefits as a result of her husband's death. 1 In addi-
tion, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint 
sought damages from the United States on the ground that 
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death. 
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that be-
cause Johnson was killed during the course of his military du-
ties, respondent could not recover damages from the United 
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the com-
plaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that 
precludes suits by service members against the Government 
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found, 
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres 
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding ac-
cording to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court 
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual para-
digm" that is present when a service member alleges negli-
gence on the part of another member of the military. 7 49 F. 
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present, 
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the 
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when 
negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government 
employee who is not a member of the military, the court 
found that the propriety of a suit should be determined by 
' Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death 
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and 
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency 
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviv-
ing spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the 
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp. 
III); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986). 
.. 
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examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. 
Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous 
rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on 
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification. 
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court 
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged 
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be 
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. 
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's 
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has 
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (cit-
ing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that 
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 2d, at 1539. and de-
clined to reach the same result. 
The Court of Appeals granted the Government's sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 
'We have identified three factors that underlie the F eres doctrine: 
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its 
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little 
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services 
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at 
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as 
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme 
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to 
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is] 
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme re-
sults that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military 
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted). 
8 In Uptegrove , the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on 
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under 
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic control-
lers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres. 
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opin-
ion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly 
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and 
whether or not the claim being considered would require ci-
vilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at 
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evalu-
ated the claim under F eres and therefore reinstated the panel 
opm10n. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, 
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual 
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because 
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to 
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a rel-
atively straightforward affirmance." Id., at 1494. 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to 
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We 
now reverse. 
II 
In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot 
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated 
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Con-
gress changed this standard in the more than 35 years since it 
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, 
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre-
'In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this 
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals cited infra, n. 8. 
5 See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States 
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138.6 Although all of the cases 
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations 
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this 
Court has never suggested that the military status of the al-
leged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7 
6 Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that 
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the 
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 
98th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1983). 
7 In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the mili-
tary status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the 
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being 
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough , sustained 
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138 
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the 
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing 
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent 
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." I d., at 
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed 
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permit-
ted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers 
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the 
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons out-
side them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal 
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and 
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and gov-
erned by federal authority."' ld., at 143-144 (quoting United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301 , 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the 
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added). 
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the 
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on 
that fact. See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere . .. to the line drawn in the 
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or 
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that 
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres 
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not in-
tend to subject the Government to . .. claims [for injuries suffered by a 
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (eraphasis added); 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres 
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant 
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied 
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members 
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the 
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases 
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of 
the United States) (emphasis added). 
8 The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492, 
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar 
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the 
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken 
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984); 
Warner v. United States , 720 F . 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted 
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by 
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226 
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part 
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. de-
nied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of gov-
ernment maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Car-
ter v. Cheyenne, 649 F . 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in 
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA 
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979) 
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civil-
ian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445 
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F . 2d 1248 (CA9 1979) 
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United 
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when 
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government em-
ployee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d 
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of military-
owned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (ser-
viceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic 
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v. 
United States, 369 F . 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982 
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guards-
man killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traf-
fic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc. 
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries. 
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 
A 
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underly-
ing the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2, 
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine 
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does 
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of 
Appeals in this case. 9 First, "[t]he relationship between the 
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively 
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree 
when a service member is performing activities incident to 
his federal service. Performance of the military function in 
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignifi-
cant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service 
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his 
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no 
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negli-
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged 
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964). 
9 Respondent puts great weight on this Court's recent observation that 
factors other than the effect of a suit on military discipline are "no longer 
controlling." United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 58, n. 4. But these 
factors alone-the availability of veterans' benefits and the anomaly of ap-
plying local law to the federal relationship between a serviceman and the 
Government he is serving-could not be controlling, otherwise almost any 
suit brought by a serviceman against the Government would be barred re-
gardless of whether the underlying injury occurred incident to service or 
whether the suit implicated military discipline concerns. Instead, these 
factors have special weight in the context in which they were articulated-
where a serviceman seeks tJ sue the Government for an injury incurred in 
the course of an activity incident to service. 
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gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] ser-
viceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying fed-
eral remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform 
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed serv-
ices," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate. 
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disabil-
ity and death benefits is an independent reason why the 
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In 
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the 
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been with-
out; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided 
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at 
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to 
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely fa-
vorably with those provided by most workmen's compensa-
tion statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is 
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litiga-
tion," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it diffi-
cult to believe that Congress would have provided such a 
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time 
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the 
FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress 
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy 
to each other." ld., at 144. Congress still has not amended 
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such 
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity 
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what 
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory 
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the 
10 Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their 
service status. For example, members of the military and their depend-
ents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-
buying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years 
of service. See generally Uniformed Services A!;nanac (L. Sharff & S. 
Gordon eds. 1985). 
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Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v. 
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673. 
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act pro-
vided compensation to injured servicemen, which we under-
stood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-
connected injuries"). 
Third, Feres and its proge_ny indicate that suits brought by 
service members against the Government for injuries in-
curred incident to service are barred by the Feres doctrine 
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally per-
mitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military af-
fairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in origi-
nal). In every respect the military is, as this Court has rec-
ognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military 
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and 
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. --, 
-- (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically 
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related ac-
tivity necessarily implicates the military judgments and deci-
sions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of 
the military mission.u Moreover, military discipline in-
volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty 
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits 
brought by service members against the Government for 
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment es-
11 Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in 
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activi-
ties would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry 
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States 
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for 
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United 
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Oper-
ations (Jan. 21, 1981). 
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sential to effective service and thus have the potential to dis-
rupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word. 
B 
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed 
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a pri-
mary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2, 
88(a)(1). '2 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose di-
rectly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an 
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on 
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status. 
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory bene-
fits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting 
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast 
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military 
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus 
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently 
has been articulated. 
III 
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is 
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
12 The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important 
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents the question whether the doctrine es-
tablished in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars 
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a 
service member killed during the course of an activity inci-
dent to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on 
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government. 
I 
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed 
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, John-
son's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat 
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast 
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel. 
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson 
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Govern-
ment. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control 
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter 
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai. 
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the 
crash. 
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received vet-
erans' benefits as a result of her husband's death. 1 In addi-
tion, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint 
sought damages from the United States on the ground that 
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death. 
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that be-
cause Johnson was killed during the course of his military du-
ties, respondent could not recover damages from the United 
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the com-
plaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that 
precludes suits by service members against the Government 
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found, 
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres 
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding ac-
cording to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court 
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual para-
digm" that is present when a service member alleges negli-
gence on the part of another member of the military. 7 49 F. 
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present, 
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the 
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when 
negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government 
employee who is not a member of the military, the court 
found that the propriety of a suit should be determined by 
1 Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death 
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and 
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency 
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviv-
ing spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the 
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp. 
III); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986). 
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examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. 
Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous 
rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on 
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification. 
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court 
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged 
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be 
scrutinized ifthis case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. 
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's 
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has 
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (cit-
ing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that 
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 2d, at 1539. and de-
clined to reach the same result. 
The Court of Appeals granted the Government's sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 
2 We have identified three factors that underlie the F eres doctrine: 
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its 
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little 
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services 
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at 
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as 
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme 
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to 
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is] 
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme re-
sults that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military 
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted). 
3 In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on 
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under 
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic control-
lers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres. 
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opin-
ion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly 
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and 
whether or not the claim being considered would require ci-
vilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at 
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evalu-
ated the claim under F eres and therefore reinstated the panel 
opm10n. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, 
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual 
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because 
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to 
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a rel-
atively straightforward affirmance." Id., at 1494. 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to 
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We 
now reverse. 
II 
In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot 
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated 
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Con-
gress changed this standard in the more than 35 years since it 
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, 
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre-
• In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
' in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this 
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals cited infra, n. 8. 
5 See United States v. Brown, 348 U, S. 110, 112 (1954); United States 
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138.6 Although all of the cases 
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations 
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this 
Court has never suggested that the military status of the al-
leged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7 
6 Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that 
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the 
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
7 In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the mili-
tary status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the 
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being 
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained 
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138 
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the 
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing 
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent 
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." Id., at 
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed 
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permit-
ted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers 
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the 
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons out-
side them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal 
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and 
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and gov-
erned by federal authority."' Id., at 143-144 (quoting United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the 
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added). 
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the 
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on 
that fact. See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the 
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or 
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that 
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres 
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not in-
tend to subject the Government to ... claims [for injuries suffered by a 
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added); 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres 
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant 
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied 
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members 
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the 
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases 
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of 
the United States) (emphasis added). 
8 The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492, 
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar 
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the 
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken 
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984); 
Warner v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted 
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by 
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226 
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part 
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. de-
nied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of gov-
ernment maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Car-
ter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in 
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA 
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979) 
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civil-
ian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445 
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979) 
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United 
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when 
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government em-
ployee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d 
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of military-
owned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (ser-
viceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic 
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v. 
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982 
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guards-
man killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traf-
fic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc. 
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries. 
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 
A 
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underly-
ing the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2, 
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine 
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does 
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of 
Appeals in this case. First, "[t]he relationship between the 
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively 
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree 
when a service member is performing activities incident to 
his federal service. Performance of the military function in 
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignifi-
cant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service 
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his 
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no 
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negli-
gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] ser-
viceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying fed-
eral remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform 
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed serv-
ices," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate. 
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disabil-
ity and death benefits is an independent reason why the 
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged 
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964). 
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Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 9 In 
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the 
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been with-
out; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided 
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at 
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to 
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely fa-
vorably with those provided by most workmen's compensa-
tion statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is 
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litiga-
tion," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it diffi-
cult to believe that Congress would have provided such a 
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time 
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the 
FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress 
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy 
to each other." !d., at 144. Congress still has not amended 
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such 
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity 
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what 
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory 
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the 
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v. 
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673. 
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act pro-
vided compensation to injured servicemen, which we under-
stood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-
connected injuries"). 
9 Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their 
service status. For example, members of the military and their depend-
ents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-
buying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years 
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (L. Sharff & S. 
Gordon eds. 1985). 
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Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by 
service members against the Government for injuries in-
curred incident to service are barred by the F eres doctrine 
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally per-
mitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military af-
fairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in origi-
nal). In every respect the military is, as this Court has rec-
ognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military 
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and 
esprit de corps;" Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. --, 
-- (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically 
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related ac-
tivity necessarily implicates the military judgments and deci-
sions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of 
the military mission. 10 Moreover, military discipline in-
volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty 
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits 
brought by service members against the Government for 
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment es-
sential to effective service and thus have the potential to dis-
rupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word. 
B 
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed 
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a pri-
mary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2, 
10 Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in 
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activi-
ties would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry 
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States 
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for 
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United 
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Oper-
ations (Jan. 21, 1981). 
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88(a)(l). 11 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose di-
rectly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an 
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on 
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status. 
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory bene-
fits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting 
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast 
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military 
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus 
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently · 
has been articulated. 
III 
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is 
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
11 The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents the question whether the doctrine es-
tablished in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars 
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a 
service member killed during the course of an activity inci-
dent to service, where the complaint alleges neglig~nce on 
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government. 
I 
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed 
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, John-
son's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat 
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast 
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel. 
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson 
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Govern-
ment. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control 
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter 
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai. 
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the 
crash. 
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received vet-
erans' benefits as a result of her husband's death. 1 In addi-
tion, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C.§§ 1346,2671-2680. Her complaint 
sought damages from the United States on the ground that 
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death. 
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that be-
cause Johnson was killed during the course of his military du-
ties, respondent could not recover damages from the United 
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the com-
plaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that 
precludes suits by service members against the Government 
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found, 
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres 
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding ac-
cording to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court 
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual para-
digm" that is present when a service member alleges negli-
gence on the part of another member of the military. 7 49 F. 
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present, 
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the 
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when 
negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government 
employee who is not a member of the military, the court 
found that the propriety of a suit should be determined by 
'Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death 
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and 
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency 
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviv-
ing spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the 
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp. 
III); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986). 
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examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. 
Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous 
rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on 
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification. 
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court 
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged 
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be 
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. 
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's 
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has 
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (cit-
ing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that 
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 2d, at 1539. and de-
clined to reach the same result. 
The Court of Appeals granted the Government's sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 
2 We have identified three factors that underlie the Feres doctrine: 
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its 
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little 
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services 
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at 
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as 
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation, scheme 
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to 
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is] 
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme re-
sults that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military 
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted). 
3 In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on 
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under 
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic control-
lers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres. 
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opin-
ion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly 
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and 
whether or not the claim being considered would require ci-
vilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at 
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evalu-
ated the claim under Feres and therefore reinstated the panel 
opmwn. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, 
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual 
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because 
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to 
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a rel-
atively straightforward affirmance." I d., at 1494. 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to 
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We 
now reverse. 
II 
In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot 
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated 
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Con-
gress changed this standard in the more than 35 years ~ince it 
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, 
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre-
'In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this 
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals cited irifra, n. 8. 
6 See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States 
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138.6 Although all of the cases 
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations 
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this 
Court has never suggested that the military status of the al-
leged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7 
6 Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that 
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the 
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
7 In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the mili-
tary status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the 
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being 
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained 
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138 
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the 
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing 
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent 
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." !d., at 
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed 
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permit-
ted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers 
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the 
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons out-
side them or norifederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal 
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and 
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and gov-
erned by federal authority.'" !d., at 143-144 (quoting United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis adde,d) (cita-
tions omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the 
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added). 
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the 
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on 
that fact. See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the 
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or 
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that 
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres 
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not in-
tend to subject the Government to ... claims [for injuries suffered by a 
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added); 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres 
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant 
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied 
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members 
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the 
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases 
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of 
the United States) (emphasis added). 
8 The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492, 
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar 
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the 
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken 
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984); 
Warner v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted 
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by 
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F . 2d 1226 
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part 
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. de-
nied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of gov-
ernment maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Car-
ter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in 
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA 
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA6 1979) 
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civil-
ian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445 
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979) 
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v.' United 
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when 
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government em-
ployee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F . 2d 
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of military-
owned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (ser-
viceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic 
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v. 
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982 
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guards-
man killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traf-
fic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc . 
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries. 
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 9 
A 
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underly-
ing the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2, 
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine 
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does 
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of 
Appeals in this case. First, "[t]he relationship between the 
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively 
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree 
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged 
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964). 
9 JUSTICE SCALIA indicates that he would consider overruling Feres had 
this been requested by counsel, but in the absence of such a request he 
would "confine the unfairness and irrationality [of] that decision" to cases 
where the allegations of negligence are limited to other members of the 
military. Post, at --. In arguing "unfairness" in this case, JUSTICE 
SCALIA assumes that had respondent been "piloting a commercial helicop-
ter" his family might recover substantially more in damages than it now 
may recover under the benefit programs available for a serviceman and his 
family, post, at--. It hardly need be said that predicting the·outcome 
of any damage suit-both with respect to liability and the amount of dam-
ages-is hazardous, whereas veterans' benefits are guaranteed by law. 
Post, at --. If "fairness"-in terms of pecuniary benefits-were the 
issue, one could respond to the dissent's assumption by noting that had the 
negligent instructions that led to Johnson's death been given by another 
serviceman, the consequences-under the dissent's view-would be 
equally "unfair." "Fairness" provides no more justification for the line 
drawn by the dissent than it does for the line upon which application of the 
Feres doctrine has always depended: whether the injury was "incident to 
service"? In sum, the dissent's argument for changing the interpretation 
of a congressional statute, when Congress has failed to do so for almost 40 
years, is unconvincing. 
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when a service member is performing activities incident to 
his federal service. Performance of the military function in 
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignifi-
cant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service 
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his 
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no 
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negli-
gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] ser-
viceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying fed-
eral remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform 
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed serv-
ices," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate. 
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disabil-
ity and death benefits is an independent reason why the 
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In 
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the 
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been with-
out; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided 
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at 
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to 
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely fa-
vorably with those provided by most workmen's compensa-
tion statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is 
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litiga-
tion," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found ·it diffi-
cult to believe that Congress would have provided such a 
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time 
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the 
10 Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their 
service status. For example, members of the military and their depend-
ents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-
buying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years 
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (L. Sharff & S. 
Gordon eds. 1985). 
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FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress 
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy 
to each other." I d., at 144. Congress still has not amended 
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such 
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity 
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what 
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory 
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the 
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v. 
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673. 
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act pro-
vided compensation to injured servicemen, which we under-
stood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-
connected injuries"). 
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by 
service members against the Government for injuries in-
curred incident to service are barred by the F eres doctrine 
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally per-
mitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military af-
fairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in origi-
nal). In every respect the military is, as this Court has rec-
ognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military 
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and 
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. s'. --, 
-- (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically 
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related ac-
tivity necessarily implicates the military judgments and deci-
sions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of 
the military mission. 11 Moreover, military discipline in-
11 Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in 
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activi-
ties would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry 
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States 
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volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty 
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits 
brought by service members against the Government for 
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment es-
sential to effective service and thus have the potential to dis-
rupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word. 
B 
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed 
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a pri-
mary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2, 
88(a)(1). 12 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose di-
rectly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an 
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on 
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status. 
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory bene-
fits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting 
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast 
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military 
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus 
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently 
has been articulated. 
III 
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is 
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injurjes to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for 
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United 
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Oper-
ations (Jan. 21 , 1981). 
'
2 The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important 
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1. 
~lisj'C. OJ 0-cL~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court 
This case presents the question whether the doctrine es-
tablished in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars 
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a 
service member killed during the course of an activity inci-
dent to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on 
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government. 
I 
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a 
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed 
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, John-
son's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat 
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast 
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel. 
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson 
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Govern-
ment. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control 
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter 
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai. 
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the 
crash. 
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received com-
pensation for her husband's death pursuant to the Veterans' 
Benefits Act, 72 Stat. 1118, as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 301 et 
seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). 1 In addition, she filed suit in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 
U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint sought damages 
from the United States on the ground that the FAA flight 
controllers negligently caused her husband's death. The 
Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because 
Johnson was killed during the course of his military duties, 
respondent could not recover damages from the United 
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the com-
plaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres. 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that 
precludes suits by service members against the Government 
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found, 
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres 
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding ac-
cording to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court 
identified what it termed "the tjpical Feres factual para-
digm" that exists when a service member alleges negligence 
on the part of another member of the military. 749 F. 2d, at 
1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present, the 
issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the course 
of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when negli-
gence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government em-
'Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death 
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and 
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency 
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviv-
ing spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the 
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp. 
Ill); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986). 
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ployee who is not a member of the military, the court found 
that the propriety of a suit should be determined by examin-
ing the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. Al-
though it noted that this Court has articulated numerous ra-
tionales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on 
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification. 
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court 
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged 
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be 
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. 
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's 
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has 
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (cit-
ing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that 
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749. F. 2d, at 1539. and de-
clined to reach the same result. 
'We have identified three factors that underlie the Feres doctrine: 
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its 
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little 
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services 
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at 
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as 
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme 
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to 
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is] 
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme re-
sults that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military 
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted). 
3 In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on 
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under 
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic control-
lers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres. 
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The Court of Appeals granted the Government's sugges-
tion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this 
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 
52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opin-
ion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly 
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and 
whether or not the claim being considered would require ci-
vilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at 
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evalu-
ated the claim under Feres and therefore reinstated the panel 
opm10n. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges, 
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual 
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because 
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to 
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a rel-
atively straightforward affirmance." I d., at 1494. 
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. -- (1986), to review the 
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to 
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We 
now reverse. 
II 
In F.eres, this Court held that service members cannot 
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that 
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to serv-
ice." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated 
from this characterization of the F eres bar. 5 Nor has Con-
gress changed this standard in the close to 40 years since it 
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres, 
' In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this 
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of 
Appeals cited infra, n. 8. 
6 See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States 
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supm, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985). 
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Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre-
tation of its intent. I d., at 138.6 Although all of the cases 
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations 
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this 
Court has never suggested that the military status of the al-
leged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7 
' Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that 
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the 
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). 
7 In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the mili-
tary status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the 
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being 
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained 
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138 
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the 
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing 
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent 
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." I d., at 
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed 
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permit-
ted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers 
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the 
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons out-
side them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal 
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and 
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and gov-
erned by federal authority."' Id., at 143-144 (quoting United States v. 
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the 
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added). 
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the 
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on 
that fact . See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the 
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or 
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that 
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres 
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not in-
tend to subject the Government to . . . claims [for injuries suffered by a 
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added); 
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant 
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied 
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members 
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres 
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the 
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United 
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v. 
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases 
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of 
the United States) (emphasis added). 
8 The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492, 
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar 
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the 
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken 
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984); 
Warner v. United States, 720 F . 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted 
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by 
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226 
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part 
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. de-
nied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of gov-
ernment maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Car-
ter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in 
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA 
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979) 
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civil-
ian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445 
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979) 
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United 
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when 
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government em-
ployee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d 
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of military-
owned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (ser-
viceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic 
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v. 
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA31966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982 
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA 7 1961) (National Guards-
man killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traf-
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries. 
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 9 
A 
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underly-
ing the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. 
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2, 
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine 
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does 
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of 
Appeals in this case. First, "[t]he relationship between the 
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively 
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree 
fie controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc. 
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged 
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines, 
Inc . v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964). 
9JUSTICE SCALIA indicates that he would consider overruling Feres had 
this been requested by counsel, but in the absence of such a request he 
would "confine the unfairness and irrationality [of] that decision" to cases 
where the allegations of negligence are limited to other members of the 
military. Post, at --. In arguing "unfairness" in this case, JUSTICE 
SCALIA assumes that had respondent been "piloting a commercial helicop-
ter" his family might recover substantially more in damages than it now 
may recover under the benefit programs available for a serviceman and his 
family. Post, at--. It hardly need be said that predicting the outcome 
of any damage suit-both with respect to liability and the amount of dam-
ages-is hazardous, whereas veterans' benefits are guaranteed by law. 
Post, at --. If "fairness"-in terms of pecuniary benefits-were the 
issue, one could respond to the dissent's assumption by noting that had the 
negligent instructions that led to Johnson's death been given by another 
serviceman, the consequences-under the dissent's view-would be 
equally "unfair." "Fairness" provides no more justification for the line 
drawn by the dissent than it does for the line upon which application of the 
Feres doctrine has always depended: whether the injury was "incident to 
service"? In sum, the dissent's argument for changing the interpretation 
of a congressional statute, when Congress has failed to do so for almost 40 
years, is unconvincing. 
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when a service member is performing activities incident to 
his federal service. Performance of the military function in 
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignifi-
cant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineer-
ing Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service 
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his 
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no 
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negli-
gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] ser-
viceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying fed-
eral remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform 
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed serv-
ices," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate. 
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disabil-
ity and death benefits is an independent reason why the 
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In 
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the 
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been with-
out; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided 
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at 
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to 
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely fa-
vorably with those provided by most workmen's compensa-
tion statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is 
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. 
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litiga-
tion," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it diffi-
cult to believe that Congress would have provided such a 
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time 
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the 
10 Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their 
service status. For example, members of the military and their depend-
ents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-
buying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years 
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (1. Sharff & S. 
Gordon eds. 1985). 
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FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress 
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy 
to each other." ld., at 144. Congress still has not amended 
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such 
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity 
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what 
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory 
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the 
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v. 
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673. 
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act pro-
vided compensation to injured servicemen, which we under-
stood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for service-
connected injuries"). 
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by 
service members against the Government for injuries in-
curred incident to service are barred by the Feres doctrine 
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally per-
mitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military af-
fairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness." 
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in origi-
nal). In every respect the military is, as this Court has rec-
ognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military 
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and 
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. --, 
-- (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically 
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related ac-
tivity necessarily implicates the military judgments and deci-
sions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of 
the military mission.u Moreover, military discipline in-
" Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in 
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activi-
ties would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry 
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States 
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volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty 
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits 
brought by service members against the Government for 
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment es-
sential to effective service and thus have the potential to dis-
rupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word. 
B 
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed 
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a pri-
mary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2, 
88(a)(1). 12 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose di-
rectly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an 
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on 
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status. 
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory bene-
fits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting 
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast 
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military 
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus 
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently 
has been articulated. 
III 
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is 
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to 
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for 
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United 
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Oper-
ations (Jan. 21, 1981). 
12 The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important 
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1. 
